Florida Appeals Court Says No Way To Rubber-Stamping Trial Judge "Nabbed" Improperly Striking Homeowner's Pleadings In Foreclosure Action

A Florida appeals court recently reversed another rubber-stamped summary judgment in a foreclosure action. This time, the state's 3rd District Court of Appeal reversed a ruling by Miami-Dade County Circuit Court Judge Mark King Leban who, on his own motion ("sua sponte"), improperly struck all of the pleadings filed by a homeowner/defendant, and then granted summary judgment for the foreclosing lender.(1)

Bringing this appeal on behalf of the homeowner were attorneys John H. Ruiz and Hector A. Peña (go here for website in Spanish), Miami, Florida.

For the ruling, see Sanchez v. LaSalle Bank National Association, No. 3D09-2095 (Fla. App. 3rd DCA, September 22, 2010).

(1) In reaching its conclusion, the court simply stated the following ("Fla. R. Civ. P." is a reference to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; bold text is my emphasis, not in the original text):

• Generally, the striking of pleadings is not favored. See, e.g., Menke v. Southland Specialties Corp., 637 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Costa Bell Dev. Corp. v. Costa Dev. Corp., 445 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).

• Florida Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a trial court sua sponte to strike a pleading which is "redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous," and, upon a party's motion, a pleading which is sham. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(f), 1.150.

• A trial court, however, should not strike a pleading sua sponte on the ground that it is legally insufficient, or because the party subsequently may not be able to prove his or her allegations. Bay Colony Office Bldg. Joint Venture v. Wachovia Mortgage Co., 342 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).

• Here, the trial court, on its own motion, struck Sanchez' affirmative defenses without finding them redundant, immaterial, impertinent, scandalous or a sham. Apparently, the trial court deemed the defenses to be lacking in specificity and support. Neither of these grounds warrants the sua sponte dismissal of Sanchez' affirmative defenses. Accordingly, we reverse the final summary judgment, and remand the cause for further proceedings.