Saturday, March 13, 2010

Brother Cops Plea To Screwing Siblings Out Of $200K Of Equity In Home Inherited From Deceased Mom

In Napa County, California, the St. Helena Star reports:

  • A Napa man has pleaded no contest to swindling his siblings out of about $200,000. Stephen Beal Berg, 67, was named as executor in his mother’s trust after she died Aug. 5, 2006, leaving her property to Berg and his four siblings, according to the Napa County district attorney’s office. Her home [...] was the most valuable of her assets, prosecutors said. In the summer of 2007, Berg told his siblings the home would go into foreclosure if he didn’t buy it from the trust. They agreed to allow him to take possession of the home, refinance the loan and distribute the remaining cash among the siblings, prosecutors said.

  • Berg paid off the existing loans with an adjustable rate mortgage from Countrywide Financial Corp. and borrowed an additional $221,000 based on the home’s equity, they said. Instead of dividing the cash between his siblings, he kept it for himself, prosecutors said. In addition, he was renting the home to others and keeping the payments, Deputy District Attorney Michael Mautner said. Berg stopped making payments on the home, which went into foreclosure in November 2009, according to the DA’s office. Area probate counsel and the siblings brought the case to the Napa Police Department, which launched an investigation in September. The district attorney’s office filed charges early this year.

For the story, see Napa man took $200,000 from family.

Cousin, Niece Get Year & A Day After Copping Pleas To Abusing POA To Loot Accounts, Sell Home Out From Under Senior Thought To Be On Deathbed

In Multnomah County, Oregon, the Corvallis Gazette Times reports:

  • An 83-year-old woman was in court to watch as two relatives who wiped out her savings and sold her home were sent to prison. Court records indicate the relatives expected Evelyn Roth to die when she was diagnosed with a cancerous growth on her esophagus in February 2008. Instead, she made a remarkable recovery. Then she learned that a cousin and a niece, who had obtained power of attorney, had sold her Portland home and her car, pocketed the proceeds and emptied out her accounts. They even prepaid her funeral.

  • Roth's cousin, Virginia Ann Kuehn, 66, and her oldest niece, Kathleen Sue Jingling, 53, pleaded no contest to seven counts of first-degree criminal mistreatment, aggravated theft and first-degree theft. Multnomah County Circuit Court Judge John Wittmayer sentenced each [] to a year and a day in prison, followed by five years probation. The extra day ensures they will serve their sentences in a state prison rather than a county jail.

***

  • Neither Kuehn nor Jingling said anything in court. Jingling did sign a check for $12,000, which was given to Roth. They've paid back more than $145,000 of the estimated $325,000 that Roth lost, Deputy District Attorney Chuck Mickley said.

  • Roth and her friends want others to know there are resources to combat such crimes. In this case, Irma Mitchell-Phillips, a Multnomah County adult protective services investigator, worked closely with Portland police Officer Deanna Wesson, who specializes in elder abuse, and Mickley, a Multnomah County prosecutor who was named late last year to focus on financial elder abuse crimes. "A lot of times, a lot of elderly and vulnerable people think their family is not going to do them wrong, but that's not the case. We see family involved over and over again," said Mitchell-Phillips, who attended Monday's sentencing.

For the story, see Theft victim watches as 2 relatives sent to prison.

Arizona Jury Convicts Real Estate Agent Facing Foreclosure Of Stripping Fixtures, Appliances From Home; Used Craigslist In Attempt To Unload Goods

In Phoenix, Arizona, KNXV-TV Channel 15 reports:

  • Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas announced [] that a man who stripped an Anthem home and put the items for sale on Craigslist was convicted of fraud after a five day trial. Kailish Bhatt, 44, was accused of illegally removing fixtures from the home that was in foreclosure. Thomas said this was the first conviction involving a 'home stripping' case. According to the FBI, Bhatt, a real estate agent, was arrested in April 2009 when he accepted $2,000 from an undercover agent after putting an ad on Craigslist attempting to sell kitchen cabinets, granite countertops, a double oven, microwave and dishwasher. Officials said the home was an investment property and not his residence.

Source: Man convicted after selling items stripped from Anthem home.

In a related story, see County attorney cracks down on 'home stripping' crimes.

Dane County Ordinance Protects Renters From "Section 8" Discrimination

In Madison, Wisconsin, WISC-TV Channel 3 reports:

  • A Dane County ordinance bans landlords from discriminating against potential tenants based on their low-income status. In 2007, Dane County enacted an ordinance that prohibits landlords from turning Section 8 renters away. But the Tenant Resource Center ["TRC"], a local renter advocacy group, said that not all landlords are aware of this ordinance. "(Section 8 renters are) a protected class, just like being a woman, or your race, or your ethnicity and all of the other protected classes. So a landlord can not make a decision to rent to you because of the fact that you receive Section 8," said Brenda Konkel of the Tenant Resource Center.

***

  • The TRC said there is no provision in the county ordinance that states landlords can’t ask if someone is on Section 8. The TRC said landlords can still screen as they would with any other tenants. But the ordinance says that landlords have to accept this kind of payment of rent if the tenant meets all the other requirements. Ordinance violations range from $500 to $2,500.

For the story, see Landlords Prohibited From Denying Tenants Based On Section 8 (Group Says Some Landlords Not Aware Of County Ordinance).

Woman Holding POA Charged In $60K Ripoff Of Elderly, Care Facility-Bound Mom; Unpaid Nursing Home Bills Trigger Probe

In Napanee, Ontario, The Canadian Press reports:

  • A woman holding power of attorney for her elderly mother has been charged with stealing from her, in a community near Kingston, Ont. Angela McKenna-Cox, 38, whose last known address was in Prince Edward Island, was charged after a lengthy investigation into a complaint from a retirement home in Amherstview.

  • She is charged with theft by person holding power of attorney, theft over $5,000, personation with intent to obtain property and two counts of fraud over $5,000. Police say it was reported that the cost and care of her elderly mother was neglected since 2007. McKenna-Cox is in custody and will appear in Napanee provincial court next Tuesday. The estimated value of the financial offences is about $60,000.

Source: P.E.I. woman charged with stealing from elderly mother in Ont. retirement home.

Jury Convicts Bay Area Woman Of Forging POA Used To Retake Title To Home Earlier Conveyed To Friend To Stop Foreclosure

In Alameda County, California, the San Jose Mercury News reports:

  • A counselor at College of Alameda has been convicted of multiple felony charges after prosecutors said she forged a power of attorney document to secure the title of her friend's home during the height of the real estate boom. Shirley Robinson, who was convicted [] in Alameda County Superior Court, will be sentenced March 29.

  • According to prosecutors, Robinson has known the victim, Alze Roberts, for 50 years. The case began in 1998, when Roberts took over the title of the college counselor's home in Oakland to prevent it from foreclosure, investigators said.

  • Robinson wished to purchase the home back from Roberts in 2005, and hoped to use its equity to pay off $175,000 she owed in state and federal back taxes. But the women disagreed on a sale price, which led Robinson to create a forged power-of-attorney so she could carry out the sale without Roberts knowing, prosecutors said.

  • Along with forging Roberts' name, Robinson stole the identity of three other individuals to help make the transaction appear legitimate. A jury deliberated five hours [] before convicting Robinson on 10 counts of forgery and identity theft. She was immediately remanded into custody.

Source: Alameda: College counselor convicted of forgery, identity theft.

Friday, March 12, 2010

San Mateo Authorities Issue Arrest Warrant For Alleged Scammer Accused Of Conning 89-Year Old Woman Into Signing Loan Docs For $312K Mortgage

In San Mateo, California, The Daily Journal reports:

  • County prosecutors issued an arrest warrant last week for a man accused of bilking an 89-year-old Pacifica woman out of nearly $600,000. Fetuu Tupoufutuna faces up to nine charges in the elder abuse case including elder fraud by a caretaker, forgery and a great taking allegation among others, San Mateo County Deputy District Attorney Melissa McKowan said yesterday. The victim, Pauline Reade, faced foreclosure on the Pacifica home she has lived in since 1951 after Tupoufutuna allegedly tricked the woman into signing loan documents to the tune of $312,000.

***

***

  • With Reade’s advanced age, Tupoufutuna must avoid arrest or a trial before the woman dies.(1) If Reade were to die before the suspect is brought to court, charges would have to be dropped. “The defendant has a right to cross-examine his accuser,” McKowan said.(2) McKowan deals with elder fraud cases regularly with entire nest eggs or home equity being devastated in many instances.(3)

For the story, see Charges filed in elder abuse case.

(1) Reportedly, Tupoufutuna has allegedly fled the country, thought to be in either New Zealand or Australia, according to Deputy District Attorney McKowan.

(2) A June 14, 2009 story in the Atlanta Journal Constitution (see Elderly victims find help to fight fraud (Many targeted by very people claiming to care. DeKalb creates task force to combat rise in crime against seniors)) reports on how one DeKalb County, Georgia prosecutor deals with the problem of the inability of elder exploitation victims to testify (ie. due to death, mental incapacity, infirmity, etc.) at the criminal trial of the alleged perpetrator:

  • Once a defendant is indicted, [prosecutor Jeanne] Canavan moves quickly to secure the elderly victims’ testimony out of concern they may be unable to testify by the time the case goes to trial. She takes a novel approach, filing court motions that cite a 2004 U.S. Supreme Court precedent that requires pre-trial testimony to be admitted only if the witness had previously been subject to cross-examination.

  • Canavan obtains a judge’s approval for a hastily called hearing, where the victim testifies before a prosecutor, the defendant and the defense attorney, who is allowed to cross examine the witness. The testimony, if needed, can be used later at trial.

  • Canavan said she will not forget her first elderly exploitation case in 2004 involving 89-year-old widower Leonard Stewart. Stewart was dining alone at a DeKalb restaurant when he was approached by Nicholas Marks. Marks befriended the elderly man, falsely identifying himself as a lawyer. Over time, Marks got Stewart to sign over possession of his car and his home. He also charged more than $22,000 on Stewart’s credit cards.

  • By the time of trial, Leonard was dead. But because he testified at a pre-trial bond hearing —- during which he was subject to cross-examination — Leonard’s testimony was admitted into evidence. Marks was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison.

For the 2004 Supreme Court precedent referred to above, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36; 124 S. Ct. 1354; 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). In addressing a criminal defendant's federal constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, the court stated:

  • According to our description of that right in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980), it does not bar admission of an unavailable witness's statement against a criminal defendant if the statement bears "adequate 'indicia of reliability.'" Id., at 66, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 2531. To meet that test, evidence must either fall within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ibid.

(3) Reportedly, Reade hired Tupoufutuna in 2006 to do some repair work to her home. Work on the home extended for months in which time the victim and suspect developed a close fiduciary relationship, according to court documents filed with San Mateo County Superior Court. Reade eventually named Tupoufutuna her executor and sole beneficiary in her will, the story states. “Tupoufutuna was aware of Pauline Reade’s significant health problems, lack of sophistication regarding real estate matters and her vulnerability given her advanced age, and given that she had no close relatives or contacts who would look after her. Defendant Tupoufutuna abused the trust Reade placed in him, and by fraud, undue influence and forgery gained control of Pauline Reade’s financial affairs,” according to court documents.

Son Gets 30 Days In $300K Ripoff Of Dementia-Stricken Mom; Victim's Rent Went Unpaid, Left w/ $13K Tax Bill On Foreclosed Home Put In Her Name

In Ramsey County, Minnesota, the Pioneer Press reports:

  • A Minneapolis man will spend 30 days in jail for financially exploiting his 95-year-old mother, who suffers from dementia, a Ramsey County judge ruled Tuesday. Joel Berntsen, 58, will serve an additional 60 days because the crime was a probation violation from a previous offense. [...] Judge Teresa Warner said she was not sure Berntsen was remorseful. "That you'd do this to your own mother is really appalling," she said. Berntsen pleaded guilty Dec. 10 to financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult.

  • The criminal complaint describes it this way: Police learned of the situation when a home health worker for the mother called them. She reported that the elderly woman's bank accounts were overdrawn because of frequent withdrawals by her son. Police found that she was behind on her rent and that several checks had bounced.

  • Berntsen told police he borrowed $290,000 from his mother in 2006 to buy a house in North Oaks after a previous home went into foreclosure. She also paid the $2,000-per-month mortgage. He said he invited his mother to live with him, but she chose to stay in her Roseville residence. Eventually, that home, too, was foreclosed upon, and Berntsen's mother got a letter from the IRS saying she owed nearly $13,000 in back taxes because Berntsen had put the home in her name. The bank then froze her account.

***

  • Prosecutor Daniel Vlieger told the court [] that cases like Berntsen's often result in a plea deal for limited jail time because the victim "may or may not be the best witness in the world" because of dementia.

For the story, see Minneapolis man sentenced for 'borrowing' from mom with dementia (He gets 90 days in jail, admits taking $300,000).

SF Man Dodges Murder Charge; Gets Five Years For Role In Using Forged POA In Attempt To Sell Missing 74-Year Old's $1M Home, Loot Bank Accounts

In Riverside, California, The Valley News reports:

  • An art dealer accused of conspiring with five other men to bilk a Palm Springs retiree -- who is missing and presumed dead -- out of his financial assets, pleaded guilty [] to fraud-related charges and was sentenced to five years in prison. Russell Herbert Manning, 68, of San Francisco, entered his plea to Riverside County Superior Court Judge Thomas Douglass over the objection of prosecutors.

  • Manning and five co-defendants allegedly forged a power of attorney document to empty one of the bank accounts and sell the million-dollar home of 74-year-old Clifford Lambert, who has been missing since December 2008. Murder charges stemming from Lambert's apparent death were dropped against Manning in September, while the other men were ordered by a judge to stand trial for his slaying.

  • Manning's attorney, Brenda Miller, said outside court that Manning had no part in the murder and was swindled by his co-defendants -- San Francisco attorney David Replogle, 60, Kaushal Niroula, 28, Danny Garcia, 27, Miguel Bustamante, 27, and Craig McCarthy, 30.(1)

For more, see Art dealer accused of bilking a missing Palm Springs man sentenced to five years.

(1) The men are accused of killing Lambert so that he could not contest forged power of attorney documents. Investigators believe Niroula let McCarthy and Bustamante into Lambert's home on Dec. 5, 2008, and that Bustamante stabbed the retiree to death. The three allegedly loaded Lambert's body into the trunk of his Mercedes-Benz and dumped his body in the hills in Fontana. Lambert was reported missing two days later by a friend. Detectives went to Lambert's home at 317 Camino Norte and found the mailbox full and his silver 2004 Mercedes missing. Following Lambert's death, Replogle allegedly created a false power of attorney document that allowed the co-defendants to empty his bank accounts. They also allegedly tried to complete a quick sale of his $1 million home for less than $300,000. A judge later halted the sale.

Brother, Sister-In-Law Forced Ailing, Now-Deceased Senior Into Granting POA, Then Looted Frail Woman's Assets, Including Home Sale Proceeds

In North Florida, The Baker County Press reports:

  • A Macclenny woman believed to be the mastermind of a scheme to bilk her elderly and infirm sister-in-law out of $340,000 in cash and other assets will spend a month in county jail and be on probation for 10 years. Francis Claudette Gray, 48, who now lives in Lake City along with co-defendant and husband Jimmy, 77, will also be required to repay $227,212 back to the estate of Margarete Gray, who died last fall of cancer in a Jacksonville nursing home.(1)

***

  • The Grays were not charged criminally until September, 2008, when assistant state attorney Geoff Fleck filed counts of felony grand theft and exploitation of the elderly. Sheriff’s investigators had completed an investigation two years earlier, and former prosecutor Mel Bessinger was hesitant to file because he feared there was little proof the couple coerced the elder Mrs. Gray to sign over power of attorney.

  • Prosecutor Fleck contended that’s exactly what they did in a blatant grab for the ailing relative’s assets. The chain of events that immediately followed in the summer of 2006 including systematic looting of Mrs. Gray’s bank accounts, cashing in of certificates of deposit, sale of her north Jacksonville house and the theft of $37,000 cash from inside the house. The thefts coincided with purchases of vehicles, a boat and two homes in west Macclenny. The defendants have since declared bankruptcy and their home was foreclosed.

For more, see $340K theft nets defendent only 30 days in jail.

(1) According to the story, the late Mrs. Gray, of German descent and a survivor of both the Nazi and Russian occupations during and after World War II, fell into ill health following the death of her husband Fred. By the time Francis & Jimmy Gray moved her to Macclenny Nursing and Rehab in the summer of 2006, she was malnourished and near comatose. Nursing home employees became alarmed at the behavior of the defendants and their son Jimmy Jr. in forcing the patient to sign over power of attorney, which they told her was necessary to salvage the value of her home in Jacksonville. At the time, it was subject to condemnation.

Gary Cop Cops Plea, Dodges Hard Time After Admitting To Using Bogus POA To Rip Off Title To Elderly, Now-Deceased Alzheimer's Victim's Home

In Lake County, Indiana, the Post Tribune reports:

  • Gary police Lt. Joshua Wiley, who admitted under oath he stole from an elderly neighbor with dementia and Alzheimer's disease and illegally took her home, was sentenced to three years in the Lake County Community Corrections Kimbrough Work Program. Wiley, 52, was ordered to repay $116,765 in restitution and has already paid $56,255.

  • Lake Superior Court Judge Diane Ross Boswell on Tuesday accepted the plea agreement submitted Sept. 21 in which Wiley pleaded guilty to theft, [...] and exploitation of an endangered adult, [...]. The agreement called for an eight-year sentence, with five years to be suspended and served on probation and three years to be served in the Kimbrough work release program.

***

  • Wiley and his wife still occupy the home he took from Helen Chentnik [...] after Wiley obtained a fraudulent quit claim deed by claiming to have power of attorney from Chentnik. [...] Questioned by deputy prosecutor Robert Neumaier, Wiley admitted on the witness stand he didn't spend any of the $116,000 he stole for Chentnik's care at a nursing home, where she died in December 2006 at age 89.

For the story, see Cop sentenced to work release in neighbor scam.

Thursday, March 11, 2010

Minnesota Mortgage Broker Gets 24 Months In $800K+ Real Estate Escrow Ripoff

From the Office of the U.S. Attorney (St. Paul, Minnesota):

  • A 41-year-old Brooklyn Center mortgage broker was sentenced today in federal court for using for personal benefit money deposited on behalf of clients into the escrow account at his mortgage title company. In St. Paul, United States District Court Judge Richard H. Kyle sentenced Terry Louis Lemke to 24 months in prison on one count of wire fraud and one count of money laundering in connection to this crime. Lemke was charged via an Information on August 3, 2009, and pled guilty on August 14, 2009.

  • In his plea agreement, Lemke admitted defrauding clients from June 2006 through 2007 by falsely representing to them that the funds they provided him as owner of All Metro Title, a mortgage brokerage company, were being held for their real estate transactions. Instead, Lemke was using that money for personal benefit. In total, Lemke defrauded clients of more than $800,000.(1)

For the U.S. Attorney press release, see Brooklyn Center mortgage broker sentenced on charges related to mortgage fraud.

(1) To the extent Lemke may have held a state license as a closing agent, the Minnesota Department of Commerce's Real Estate Education, Research and Recovery Fund could potentially find itself on the hook for some or all of the monetary losses suffered by any victims of the swindle. According to their website:

  • The purpose of the Real Estate Education, Research and Recovery Fund is to compensate any person who has lost money due to a licensed real estate broker, salesperson, or closing agent’s fraudulent, deceptive or dishonest practices, or conversion of trust funds. The improper action that was committed must be an activity that required a license. [...] Applicants may be awarded any amount from $0 to $150,000, [...].

Insurer To Owner Of Fire-Damaged Inn Facing Foreclosure Who Filed $6M Insurance Claim: "Take A Hike!"

In Asheville, North Carolina, WRAL-TV reports:

  • The company that insured a historic inn in western North Carolina is refusing to pay for damages from a fire, saying someone associated with the owners is responsible for the blaze. The Asheville Citizen-Times reported Thursday the owner is accusing former employees of the Richmond Hill Inn of setting the fire last year that destroyed the inn's centerpiece mansion as it faced a scheduled foreclosure auction.

  • Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co. filed a letter with the court in January saying it wouldn't pay the claim seeking at least $6 million. In turn, owner William Gray posted a note on the inn's Web site saying he wouldn't be able to reopen because of vandalism, theft and arson by former employees.

  • Harleysville's lawsuit asks a court to void an insurance claim filed by The Hammocks seeking at least $6 million. It says the company won't pay for "loss caused by or resulting from criminal, fraudulent, dishonest or illegal acts committed alone or in collusion with another." [...] The inn's foreclosure had been finalized March 16, 2009, with an auction scheduled a month later. But on March 19, an early morning fire destroyed the mansion.

For more, see Insurer: No money for damage at NC inn that burned.

Brooklyn Arson Probe Leads To Duo's Convictions In Straw Buyer Scam; Pair Pocketed $300K+

From the Office of the Brooklyn, New York District Attorney:

  • Kings County District Attorney Charles J. Hynes [] announced the conviction(1) of Mavis Samuel, 41, and Carlyle Ebanks, 55, for selling the same Crown Heights building twice, to two different straw buyers. [...] The defendants first sold 1162 Pacific Street in September 2004. In that transaction, they paid a straw buyer $4,000 to buy the building. Though the straw buyer held the deed, Ebanks and Samuel maintained control of the building. While the straw buyer was recovering from a traumatic brain injury in spring 2005, Samuel convinced him to deed the property back to her.

  • Then, in November 2006, Ebanks approached a friend and told him that if he bought the building, Samuel and Ebanks would make him a partner in their real estate investment company. The defendants illegally inflated the “partner’s” income and savings account balance on a $1 million mortgage application, to buy 1162 Pacific Street for that price. With that “sale”, they paid off the mortgage on the original straw purchase, pocketed between $300,000 and $400,000, and maintained ownership.

  • In the time between the two sales, the building burned down. The case originated with the investigation into a string of suspected arsons in Crown Heights in early 2006.
For the Brooklyn DA press release, see Kings County District Attorney Charles J. Hynes Announces Conviction In Real Estate Fraud.

(1) They were convicted of Grand Larceny in the Second Degree and multiple counts of Falsifying Business Records in the First Degree, and face up to 15 years in prison, the press relates states.

Another "Lease To Own" Horror Story As Rent Skimming Landlord Stiffs Bank, Pockets Payments From Would-Be Buyer; Single Mom, Kids Left Facing The Boot

In Burleson, Texas, WFAA-TV reports:

  • It's not her dream house, but it is Teresa Salinas' first home. Now, the single mother said she is afraid she will lose her home after learning it's in foreclosure. The Burleson house is up for public auction Tuesday at the Johnson County courthouse. "I can't afford to buy a house and my credit isn't good enough to rent an apartment," she said.

  • The mother of two was renting-to-own the home from a company called Buying Homes Today TX Inc. The company is operated by Lana Smeenk, who according to bank records has been receiving mortgage payments monthly from Salinas. Those payments apparently were not used to pay down the loan, and Salinas got a foreclosure notice in late February.

***

  • Smeenk has not returned calls or e-mails, her clients said. "I have nothing to say, thank you," she told WFAA from her Joshua home. She also turned down an interview request from WFAA.

For the story, see Burleson mom faces foreclosure despite monthly payments.

For story follow-up, see Eviction notices canceled by California investors.

SF Man Held On $7M+ Bail In Theft Of Three Luxury Condos Using Forged Deeds; Victim Faces Long Road To Restore Title In Her Name

In San Francisco, California, KGO-TV Channel 7 reports:

  • A San Francisco man accused of illegally transferring ownership of three condos to himself is being held on more than $7 million bail. It's a crime authorities say is sophisticated in its execution, yet simple in the ease it was carried out. At stake are millions of dollars in real estate on one of San Francisco's most exclusive properties.

  • One Rincon Hill is one of the newest additions to San Francisco's skyline and where a penthouse lists for $14 million. It's also where a man already facing trial in a separate burglary now stands accused of stealing three condos from a real estate executive, Shirley Hwang. Winston Lum faces 16 felony counts of forgery, grand theft and identity theft. Court documents obtained by 7 On Your Side show 45-year-old is suspected of forging the owner's name onto the deeds of three of her condos, then granting to himself those properties.

***

  • SFPD won't talk specifically about this case, but say it's a type of crime they're seeing more. "We've gotten quite a few in the last few years and like I said it's a relatively new crime," Lt. Jones Wong said. "I think the criminals have just gotten more sophisticated." Lieutenant Wong says if the documents are notarized, it's unlikely the forgery will be discovered when filed at the Recorder's Office.

***

  • For the victim, this is a case of identity theft that could take years to unwind. "It's terrible. These poor victims have to go through a lot to show they are an innocent victim," Lt Jones Wong from SFPD said. [...] Hwang has sued Lum and his lender, DeWitt Mortgage to try to get her properties back and to get the liens removed from them. Compounding matters, Hwang must also fight a transfer tax bill of $50,000.

For the story, see SF man accused of stealing 3 luxury condos.

Ex-Mortgage Broker Pocketed $1M+ By Acquiring, Selling Vacant Lots, Abandoned Properties Using Forged Deeds, Say Fort Worth Feds

In Fort Worth, Texas, the Star Telegram reports:

  • For more than two years, authorities say, former mortgage broker Norris Lynn Fisher toured Tarrant County looking for vacant lots and properties that looked abandoned. When he found one, he would forge a deed to transfer the property to fictitious owners, repeating the process several times before selling it to one of his companies, investigators said. In that way, Fisher netted more than $1 million by fraudulently acquiring more than 100 Tarrant County properties, according to a 19-page criminal complaint unsealed Friday after Fisher was arraigned in federal court on a mail fraud charge.(1)

***

  • A man told an investigator that his name had been forged on a fraudulent deed and transferred to a fictitious woman in Los Angeles and then forwarded to a Fort Worth post office box rented by Fisher. In renting the box, Fisher identified himself as secretary-treasurer of J-Tex Construction Inc. That forwarding tactic was used in many of the deed transfers, as was the use of forged signatures on notary seals affixed to the deed, investigators said. Seven notary stamps were found during a July 2009 search of Fisher's Fort Worth home, the complaint states. At least one was linked to forged notary signatures, investigators said.

  • Many of the victims were elderly, including 84-year-old Margaret Jennings who learned that she no longer owned her late father's land when she tried to pay her taxes. "The lady told me two other people bought that land," Jennings said. "I said they didn't buy it lawfully, but she said they owned it. "I've been worried a lot about it. It made me sick that my daddy worked so hard for that little piece of land."

For more, see Ex-broker accused of fraudulently acquiring more than 100 Dallas-Fort Worth properties.

For the U.S. Attorney press release, see Fort Worth, Texas Man Arrested For Stealing more Than $1 Million In Real Estate From Rightful Owners (Federal Complaint Charges Norris L. Fisher with Mail Fraud).

(1) According to this story, the criminal complaint alleges that Fisher usually targeted vacant lots with unpaid back taxes or liens, and in some cases, Fisher acquired property by forging affidavits of heirship from deceased property owners.

Colorado AG Indicts Three In Alleged Fraud Scheme Designed To Rip Off Home Sellers, Lenders

From the Office of the Colorado Attorney General:

  • Colorado Attorney General John Suthers announced [] that the Statewide Grand Jury has indicted Marcus Williams [], Kimberly Anderson [] and Scott Peters [] on suspicion of running an elaborate mortgage-fraud scheme under the auspices of Blackhawk Property Management. According to the 23-count indictment, Williams, Anderson and Peters diverted money from home sellers or funding companies to Blackhawk Property Management, which functioned as a shell company. During the deals, the suspects allegedly falsified loan applications to deceive lenders; used false inspections to divert money into the company’s coffers; and, manipulated closing documents to skim money off real estate purchases.

For the Colorado AG press release, see Attorney General announced indictment of three Coloradans involved in a complex, Denver-area mortgage fraud enterprise.

Wednesday, March 10, 2010

Information On Foreclosure Mediation Programs & Mandatory Conferences Around The Country

The National Consumer Law Center provides links on its website to information that summarizes the state/local programs around the country that establish some type of foreclosure diversion program requiring lenders to engage in mediation, conciliation, or a settlement conference. Summaries include a general program description and lender and borrower obligations under the program. Links to text of enabling legislation, administrative orders, court rules, forms and other information links related to programs are also provided.

For more, see Programs for Foreclosure Mediation and Mandatory Conferences.

Zombie Debt Buyer Reneges On Oral Settlement Agreement, Moves To Force Sale Of Texas Couple's Home After Already Pocketing $9K, Says Suit

In Beaumont, Texas, The Southeast Texas Record reports:

  • A Jefferson County couple has filed suit against a debt purchasing company, alleging the company has reneged on an oral settlement agreement and is now attempting to sell the couple's home.

  • Leonard and Beverly Randle claim they had been sued for deficiencies they owed on their credit cards. Defendant Hudson & Keyes LLC(1) obtained a judgment against the Randles for $27,895.69, according to the complaint filed Feb. 19 in Jefferson County District Court.

  • The Randles entered into an oral agreement with Hudson & Keyes to settle the matter for $10,000, the suit states. The Randles agreed to make an initial $6,000 down payment, then to pay $200 every month until the debt was paid in full, the complaint says. The Randles claim they have followed the plan and have paid $9,200 of the settlement money.

  • "Thus it was to Plaintiffs' great surprise and distress when they learned that Defendant, despite and contrary to the Settlement Agreement, has proceeded with a Constable's sale of property of Plaintiffs at the address commonly known as 4825 Wyatt St. in Beaumont," the suit states. "Plaintiffs are now in desperate straits. They have been notified that the sale of the Property has been scheduled for March 2, 2010."

  • The Randles are seeking a temporary restraining order that will restrain Hudson and Keyes from selling their property and, after trial, a permanent order enjoining the firm from selling the property. In addition, they seek other relief the court deems just.

Source: Couple seeks TRO against debt purchasing company.

(1) According to its Web site, Hudson & Keyes is a debt buyer and reseller. zombie debt

Foreclosure-Related Federal Lawsuits Against Lenders Skyrocket In California; Reflect Borrowers' Difficulty In Getting Loan Modifications

In San Jose, California, the San Jose Mercury News reports:

  • In the last five years, the number of foreclosure lawsuits filed in federal court in California has ballooned — like an exploding adjustable-rate mortgage — from only 29 statewide in 2005 to nearly 1,400 last year. Many such lawsuits also are filed in state courts, which don't track the numbers or the outcomes.

  • The striking increase in suits against lenders reflects the difficulty many with underwater mortgages are having in getting loan modifications, either through the government program or the banks themselves.

***

  • Some suits contend the lender reneged on a promise of a loan modification, [...]. Others argue lenders screwed up the foreclosure process. Among the most frequent claims: During the overheated housing boom, the bank did not properly disclose the terms of the loan, the borrower never really qualified, but got a loan anyhow.

For more, see Increasing numbers of Californians are suing lenders to avoid foreclosures.

Another Homeowner Gets Stiffed On Lender's Loan Modification Promises, Faces Imminent Foreclosure, Says Texas Suit

In Jefferson County, Texas, The Southeast Texas Record reports:

  • A woman has filed suit against a loan servicing agency and a mortgage company after she claims they have threatened to foreclose on her home. Lisa D. Perkins claims she owns a home [...] in Port Arthur. Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems currently owns the mortgage on the home and defendant Litton Loan Servicing is the mortgage servicer for Mortgage Electronic, according to the complaint filed Feb. 17 in Jefferson County District Court.

  • On Aug. 1, 2009, Perkins entered into a loan workout with Litton. Under the plan, Litton promised to modify Perkins' mortgage as long as she complied with all terms of the plan, the suit states. Perkins has complied with all the plan's terms, yet Litton still notified her of its intent to foreclose on her home on March 2, the complaint says. "Plaintiff relied on these misrepresentations by Defendants to her detriment," the suit states. By foreclosing on her home, Perkins claims Litton and Mortgage Electronic violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and breached their contract with her.(1)

Source: Woman seeks TRO to stop foreclosure.

(1) Reportedly, Perkins seeks an ex-parte temporary and permanent injunction from the court demanding that Litton and Mortgage Electronic refrain from foreclosing on her home, the suit states. In addition, she seeks actual, consequential and statutory damages, attorney's fees, costs, pre- and post-judgment interest and other relief to which she may be entitled, the story states.

Lawsuits Alleging "HAMP" Violations By Lenders Not Following Through On Loan Modification Promises Begin To Gain Traction

In Cincinnati, Ohio, Fox News reports:

  • You qualify. Those two words, from the mouth of a bank representative last October, triggered a wave of relief for Tracy Davis and her husband James. The couple had been in and out of work for three years and were struggling to pay their mortgage -- so when the Bank of America worker told them they qualified under a federal program to have their loan modified [ie. the Home Affordable Modification Program -"HAMP"], they finally saw a path to keeping their house. "We walked out thinking, great," Tracy Davis said. But weeks went by, and nobody contacted them, and they weren't able to reach anyone -- other than representatives at a call center in India. "To this day, we've not heard from someone," she said. "It's February. This goes back to October 30."

  • The Davises, who live in Cincinnati, are among a slew of struggling homeowners coming forward with complaints about the way banks are operating under a federal loan modification program announced last year by the Obama administration.

***

  • The complaints have a common tune. Homeowners say the banks are giving them the runaround -- either by pledging to modify loans and then not following through, as with the Davis family, or by signing them up for the trial period and then leaving them in limbo. "This is an epidemic problem," said Stuart Rossman, director of litigation with the National Consumer Law Center.

  • Under the terms of the Treasury Department program, participating banks that offer new loan terms are supposed to put homeowners through a three-month trial period. If the homeowners make timely payments and meet other conditions, the terms are supposed to become permanent. But a pair of lawsuits filed in U.S. District Court in Boston [...] claimed Bank of America and Wells Fargo were violating those rules. Rossman, who is helping to represent the plaintiffs, said banks -- in Massachusetts and across the country -- are stringing homeowners along for months without sealing the deal. "That, to us, is inexcusable and a breach of contract," he said. "They are living in limbo while they are at risk of losing their home."

***

  • In Ohio, the Davises were among 10 plaintiffs in a suit filed against Bank of America in early February in U.S. District Court.(1) The homeowners all say they experienced the same problem. According to the suit, they went to a Treasury-sponsored "borrower outreach" event in Cincinnati at the end of October at which bank representatives offered them modified home loans and pledged to send them the paperwork "within weeks." The documents never came, they say. [...] Mark Lawson, an attorney with the Legal Aid Society of Southwest Ohio representing the plaintiffs in the Ohio federal case, said loan modification problems are widespread. "It's pretty much everywhere," he said.

For the story, see Homeowners Say Banks Keep Them Underwater by Spurning Loan Program Rules (A slew of struggling homeowners are coming forward with complaints about the way banks are operating under a federal loan modification program announced last year by the Obama administration).

(1) For the Ohio Federal lawsuit, see Ponder et al. v. Bank of America, BAC Home Loans Servicing.

Tuesday, March 9, 2010

Chicago Feds Charge Closing Agent In $500K+ Real Estate Escrow Swindle; Ripoff Of Insurance Premiums Due To Title Underwriter Among Allegations

From the Office of the U.S. Attorney (Rockford, Illinois):

  • A federal grand jury in Rockford [] returned a seven-count indictment charging KIRBY SEAN MCKEE ("McKee"), age 50, of Davis, Illinois, with having embezzled more than $500,000 in funds that had been placed in escrow accounts and insurance premiums. McKee is charged in the indictment with embezzling money, funds and premiums of A Title Escrow Company, Inc. ("ATEC") and Stewart Title Guaranty Company, ("Stewart").(1)

***

  • The indictment alleges that McKee embezzled more than $500,000 that had been provided by title insurance customers to ATEC and placed in escrow accounts. [...] The indictment [...] also charges McKee with having embezzled title insurance premiums ATEC had collected from its customers on behalf of Stewart. Instead of remitting those premiums to Stewart, the indictment charges that McKee embezzled and misappropriated those premiums to his own use and for the use of ATEC.

For the entire press release, see Former Freeport Title Company Manager Indicted On Federal Insurance Embezzlement Charges.

(1) According to the indictment, ATEC was a title and escrow company located in Freeport, and was a registered agent of Stewart, a Texas-based title insurance company. The indictment states that ATEC had, in the Freeport area, sold title insurance policies issued by Stewart.

Wisconsin Regulator Orders Firm To Refund Fees Received From Unlicensed Loan Modification Services

In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reports:

  • A regulator has ordered a Janesville foreclosure consultant not to sell mortgage modification services and to refund fees it has charged to customers. Rightway Solutions Inc. has been operating without an "adjustment service company" license needed to provide services to help debtors modify mortgages, the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions says.

***

  • Rightway and Gorniak are ordered to refund any fees charged to adjustment service customers in Wisconsin since Feb. 27, 2009. By March 26 of this year, Rightway must forward to DFI the refund checks and stamped envelopes to each customer, along with letters telling the customers about the refund, the order states.

For more, see State orders Janesville firm to stop mortgage modification service.

For the Wisconsin DFI order, see In re: Rightway Solutions Inc. / Marietta J. Gorniak.

Cal. AG Urged To Follow Connecticut Colleague In Hammering Lenders, Lawyers, Real Estate Agents Illegally Steamrolling Tenants Out Of Foreclosed Homes

In San Francisco, California, Dean Preston, executive director of Tenants Together, writes in Beyond Chron:

  • Across our state, realtors and lawyers working on behalf of banks are violating federal law by illegally pushing renters out of their homes after foreclosure. The results are devastating, with thousands of tenants being driven into homelessness and communities left with vacancies and blight. Responding to a similar pattern of illegal evictions in Connecticut, Attorney General Richard Blumenthal recently announced a new initiative to aid tenants of foreclosed properties. Blumenthal issued cease-and-desist letters warning law firms, real estate companies, banks and loan servicers to stop illegal evictions. Here in California, tenants want to know whether Attorney General Edmund G. (“Jerry”) Brown, Jr., will follow Blumenthal’s lead and take decisive actions to protect vulnerable tenants.(1)

For more, see Brown Should Follow Connecticut AG’s Lead: Go After Banks, Realtors and Lawyers that Violate Tenant Rights.

In related stories, see:

(1) The Protecting Tenants At Foreclosure Act (PTFA) (go here for federal statute) allows tenants to stay in their homes after foreclosure for at least 90 days or until the end of their lease term, whichever is later. According to the story, in cities with just cause for eviction ordinances, tenants may not have to vacate at all after foreclosure. Despite these laws, real estate agents and lawyers working for banks routinely violate tenant rights, the story states. Tenants Together reportedly operates California’s only statewide hotline for tenants in foreclosure situations, receiving calls from tenants around the state who are being lied to about their rights and illegally evicted from their homes by bank lawyers and real estate agents, according to the story.

Go here for laws protecting tenants in foreclosure situations in California.

Prohibitive Repair Costs May Be Cause Of Foreclosing Lenders Avoiding Taking Title To Properties Securing Delinquent Loans

In Akron, Ohio, WKYC-TV Channel 3 reports:

  • Neighbors say the Hite Avenue home has set empty for more than six months, another casualty of the foreclosure epidemic that has ripped across Northeast Ohio. After Friday's sheriff's sale, the home will likely sit empty a while longer.

  • Wells Fargo, the bank that foreclosed on the South Akron home, failed to show up at the auction to at least match the opening bid on the property. County rules mandate foreclosures be offered at two-thirds of the home's appraised value. The single-family home near Manchester Road is appraised at $60,000, so it was offered at auction for $40,000.

  • Wells Fargo wasn't alone. Of the 60 properties offered at Friday's weekly sale, 33 went unclaimed due to banks that failed to show up. Since neither the bank holding the mortgage nor another buyer placed a bid, the properties remain in the name of the homeowner, who accumulates additional property taxes as the property often sits empty. It also means the bank is not taking steps to reclaim and sell the property, leaving vacant homes vacant for a while longer.

Source: Northeast Ohio: Banks fail to claim properties after foreclosing.

Miami Judge Orders $9K+ In Sanctions On Lender For Purposely Delaying Foreclosure Sale On Condo

In Miami, Florida, the South Florida Sun Sentinel reports:

  • Can Florida banks be held financially accountable for purposely delaying condo bank foreclosure sales? A new South Florida circuit court ruling says yes. Amid a growing clamor for Florida banks to bear more of the financial burden caused by widespread condo foreclosures, the Miami-Dade Circuit Court case settled last week shows an example of associations turning more often to courts for relief from revenue losses tied to the state's condo crisis. And it could pave the way for other South Florida condo associations faced with stalled foreclosures caused by lenders.

***

  • Miami-Dade Circuit Court Judge William Thomas sanctioned Deutch [sic] Bank for not sending a representative to a foreclosure sale as required by an earlier court judgment, a move that automatically cancels a sale date, and for not publishing a public notice in a local newspaper in time for another foreclosure sale date, again causing the sale cancellation.

  • Although Deutch [sic] did not offer explanations in court for the delays, its attorney argued that Florida courts are not allowed to force banks to pay condo association fees. Another recent ruling by the 3rd District Court of Appeals(1) in Florida held that a bank could not be ordered to pay monthly maintenance fees before obtaining title to a unit. Thomas' ruling, however, sanctioned Deutch for improper conduct related to the foreclosure case. The bank was ordered to pay about $7,300 in sanctions to the association and $2,000 to cover its legal fees.

For more, see Miami-Dade ruling shows banks may be fined for delays in condo foreclosure sales.

(1) U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ex rel. Harborview 2005-10 Trust Fund v. Tadmore, 23 So. 3d 822; 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 18408 (Fla. Ct. App. 3rd DCA, 2009).

Use Of Owner Financing, Failure To Obtain Title Insurance Lead To Purchase Of Homes w/ Undisclosed Liens By Unwitting Buyers, Says Texas AG In Lawsuit

From the Office of the Texas Attorney General:

  • Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott charged a South Texas developer with defrauding first-time home buyers by unlawfully selling houses that were encumbered by undisclosed liens. The defendant, McAllen-based Grande Valley Homes LLC, which is registered to do business as Casa Linda Homes, both sells and finances residential real estate property. Its business model focuses on first-time home buyers, particularly those with poor credit histories [...]. According to the state’s enforcement action,(1) Casa Linda sold residential properties that were encumbered by one of the following liens: a lien for delinquent property taxes; a lien of a third-party lender; or a mechanic’s lien for labor or materials used to improve the property.

  • Documents filed with the Cameron County District Court indicate that Casa Linda Homes did not disclose the liens when unsuspecting buyers entered into their earnest money contracts. When Casa Linda Homes subsequently failed to pay its undisclosed debt, the creditors who were owed money then instituted foreclosure proceedings or filed lawsuits against the home buyers.

  • The defendant was able to perpetuate this fraud, in part, because the houses were “owner financed” by Casa Linda Homes. As a result, purchasers were not warned about the undisclosed liens by title companies, because Casa Linda did not require home buyers to purchase title insurance. Thus, the developer could sell the properties without home buyers – particularly inexperienced, first-time home buyers – realizing that their new houses were subject to undisclosed liens.

For the entire Texas AG press release, see Attorney General Abbott Charges South Texas Home Developer With Unlawfully Selling Houses (Developer charged with selling houses that had undisclosed liens; buyers face foreclosure, debt).

For more from the Texas AG on this case, see:

(1) The state AG's civil lawsuit alleges violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act.

Monday, March 8, 2010

Trustee Ordered To Cough Up The Cash In Wrongful Foreclosure; Conducted Auction Despite Notification By Owner's Court-Appointed Rep Of Pending Sale

In King County, Washington, The Seattle Times reports:

  • A King County judge [...] ordered one of the West Coast's major players in the foreclosure industry to pay more than $230,000 to the estate of a disabled senior citizen whose Whidbey Island home was wrongfully auctioned off after she fell behind on payments. Legal experts say it appears to be one of the first home-foreclosure cases to reach a jury verdict in Washington.

  • At a foreclosure auction on Feb. 29, 2008, Quality Loan Service Corp. of Washington sold Dorothy Halstien's home for about $83,000 — even though her court-appointed guardian notified the company 11 days earlier of a signed contract to sell the house for $235,000 by mid-March. The auction meant Halstien lost more than $150,000 of her home equity.(1)

***

  • At the auction, an investor bought Halstien's house for $1 over Quality's opening bid and flipped the property six months later for $235,000, getting the equity that Halstien, a retired factory worker, had built up over decades. Superior Court Judge Barbara Mack's order finalizes a jury verdict in late January that found Quality and its San Diego-based parent company, Quality Loan Service Corp., violated the state Consumer Protection Act and breached its contract with Halstien.

For more, see Washington company must pay estate in wrongful auction.

(1) Reportedly, while Quality had the discretion under state law to postpone the foreclosure, it blindly followed WaMu's instructions to proceed with foreclosure, said Frederick Corbit, senior attorney at nonprofit Northwest Justice Project, which represented the estate's court-appointed guardian, Dianne Klem. "The trustee is not a repo agent," Corbit said. "Any reasonable trustee would have postponed the sale for three weeks."

C. Fla. Circuit Court Chief: Foreclosure Mill Law Firms' "License Could Be On The Line" Regarding State "Supremes" Directive To File Proper Paperwork

In Sarasota, Florida, Sarasota Herald Tribune columnist Tom Lyons writes:

  • Law firms that some call "foreclosure mills" handle loan default cases by the thousands for financial institutions that were not the original lenders. Some have filed odd documents in their court cases. Many claim loan documents are lost, but that ownership of the note was transferred, perhaps multiple times, and that the foreclosing bank is now the owner or trustee.

  • Problem is, they rarely show a clear chain of transfers back to the original lender. Often, the documents are not only vague but also of fresh vintage. Some are only created, signed and notarized after the foreclosure is filed. And signatures authorizing the transfers make fun reading. Some people listed as vice presidents and the like often are not, and were never even employees of the companies named. They work for companies that are hired to create the documents.

  • When accused of using sham documents, the response has sometimes been that the signers were somehow authorized to sign, a claim some judges have rejected.

***

  • In uncontested cases, most still slip by, and [Sarasota County Circuit Court Chief Judge Lee] Haworth says judges have too many cases to do the checking that a defense lawyer would do. But there is bigger news that should help, Haworth says.

  • Last month, Florida's Supreme Court decided that attorneys filing foreclosure cases will no longer be presumed blameless when they claim a right to foreclose based on faulty documents.(1) The foreclosure mills normally rely on an army of assistants and clerical workers, and lawyers claiming that an assistant's error led to a faulty filing have rarely been called to task. That's about to change, Haworth says.

  • Some may still gamble in cases where they expect no opposition lawyer will be checking the documents. But if they take the time and effort, most should be able to do things right and establish their claims, Haworth said. If not, he said, they'll have a problem. "I'm looking forward to see how they do comply," Haworth said. "Their license could be on the line."

For the story, see Documents insufficient in foreclosure case.

(1) See:

Bankruptcy Court Denies Lender's Request To Proceed With Foreclosure Of Delinquent Mortgage On Real Estate Inherited From Deceased Owner

The following facts have been taken from a recent ruling from a Federal bankruptcy court in Missouri:

  • Father buys real estate, financing the purchase with a loan from Bank/Creditor secured by a deed of trust.
  • Father dies four weeks later.
  • Daughter, as sole survivor, acquires through inheritance Father's real estate, subject to the secured debt.
  • Daughter encounters financial problems and defaults on mortgage payments, causing Bank/Creditor to initiate a foreclosure action.
  • Daughter files for Chapter 13 bankruptcy to stop the foreclosure.
  • Daughter proposes Chapter 13 payment plan which provides that she will pay certain amounts to cure pre-petition arrears on the Bank/Creditor's claim. Daughter also proposes to make post-petition payments to the Bank/Creditor outside of the Daughter's Chapter 13 plan. (The Loan Documents were never modified to show the Daughter as a borrower or obligor. Accordingly, the parties do not dispute that Daughter has no personal liability to the Bank/Creditor for the amounts owed under the loan documents.)
  • Bank/Creditor files request to lift the automatic stay for the purpose of completing the foreclosure action.

The issue before the Court is whether Daughter may defeat Bank/Creditor's request for relief from the automatic stay by including in her Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan the Creditor's claim against property that the Daughter acquired through a pre-petition inheritance, even though the Daughter was never in privity with Bank/Creditor on a promissory note or deed of trust in which the property was pledged as security, and modify the rights (ie. "cram down") of Bank/Creditor.

Relying in large part on the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 115 L.Ed. 2d 66 (1991), the bankruptcy court held that Daughter was permitted to handle the payments on the Bank/Creditor's secured loan as proposed, despite the lack of privity, and the Bank/Creditor's request to lift the automatic stay was denied.(1)(2)

For the court's ruling, see In re: Rhonda M. Holmes, Case No. 10-41140-399, Motion No. 8., 10 (USBC E.D. Missouri, East. Div., March 3, 2010).

(1) Apparently sensing the possibility that some clever real estate operators and others might attempt to use this ruling as a basis for acquiring real estate subject to existing mortgages or deeds of trust without formally assuming the loan with the lender, and then look to invoke the "cramdown" provisions of 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2) to legally screw it by modifying its rights through a subsequent Chapter 13 filing, the Missouri Eastern District's Chief Bankruptcy Judge Barry S. Schermer concluded his ruling with the following admonition to those opportunists:

  • This holding is limited to the facts presented here, specifically, a ruling on a motion for relief from the automatic stay where a debtor obtained real property by inheritance or operation of death, rather than by a conveyance of realty from one party to another unrelated party.

  • This Court expresses grave concern that litigants will try to extend this holding to a situation where a stranger to a loan acquires real property serving as collateral for the loan, and then tries to defeat a lender's request for stay relief by modifying the lender's rights through his subsequent Chapter 13 case. Those parties should remember, among other things, that Bankruptcy Code section 362(d)(4)(A) requires a court to grant relief from the automatic stay:

  • (4) with respect to a stay of an act against real property . . ., if the court finds that the filing of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors that involved ... (A) transfer of all or part ownership of, or other interest in, such real property without the consent of the secured creditor or court approval. 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(4)(A).

(2) An issue not addressed in this case is the (incorrect) belief of many that a lender could invoke the "due-on-sale" clause in a mortgage when title to real estate containing less than five dwelling units is transferred to a surviving relative upon the death of the owner in order to proceed with foreclosure, even if the mortgage loan is not in default. According to Federal law, a lender "may not exercise its option pursuant to a due-on-sale clause upon ... a transfer to a relative resulting from the death of a borrower." See 12 USC 1701j–3(d)(5) - Preemption of due-on-sale prohibitions (Exemption of specified transfers or dispositions). See also, Federal law protects those who inherit homes.

Central Florida Judge Admits Foreclosure Ruling Subsequently Reversed On Appeal Wasn't His Best Work

In Central Florida, Sarasota Herald Tribune columnist Tom Lyons writes:

  • When a ruling is reversed by an appellate court, the judge faulted sometimes grumbles. So I didn't know what to expect when I asked Circuit Court Judge Robert Bennett about an appellate court ruling that overturned a house foreclosure he had granted.(1) The three-judge panel said a bank that was not the original lender had not proven it had the right to foreclose, because the documents filed did not show how, or if, mortgage ownership had ever been transferred to the bank.

  • Bennett's reaction? The higher court was totally right, he said. "I'm willing to fall on my sword on this one," Bennett said. "It wasn't a very good piece of judge work."(2)

  • To be fair, many judges have done much the same thing in similar cases, partly because most foreclosures had long been so routine. If contested at all, it was rare that anyone claimed a major financial institution had not proven any link to the mortgage. Now, just a couple of years since Bennett's ruling on a foreclosure case he cannot even recall, that sort of claim has become commonplace. Of the dozen or so lawyers I've heard from who fight foreclosures -- a common specialty these days -- all mentioned that issue. "This issue of standing, it's common throughout the state," said circuit Chief Judge Lee Haworth.

***

  • Bennett's ruling happened before all this became as ordinary in Southwest Florida as sunshine. Few judges then thought to doubt that a bank had standing to foreclose.

For the story, see Documents insufficient in foreclosure case.

(1) See BAC Funding Consortium Inc. v. Jean-Jacques, et ano., Case #2D08-3553 (February 12, 2010). Go here for BAC Funding's appellate brief, describing the sloppy, careless conduct of the lender and its assembly line, foreclosure mill attorney in prosecuting this case (available online courtesy of MattWeidnerLaw.com).

See also, Florida Appeals Court "Deep-Sixes" Rubber-Stamped Foreclosure Judgment; Kicks Case Back To Trial Court For Further Proceedings.

(2) Hopefully, Judge Bennett's reversed ruling was attributable to him simply having an off day. After all, even Babe Ruth struck out from time to time.

Florida Appeals Court Boots Another Rubber-Stamped Foreclosure Case; Docs Supporting Judgment Filed Late, Failed To Establish Legal Standing

Florida's 2nd District Court of Appeal struck again and reversed another trial judge for allowing a lender steamroll a foreclosure action against a financially strapped property owner.(1) In this case, the trial judge rubber-stamped a foreclosure judgment for a lender despite the fact that the property owner argued, among other things:

  • that his response to the lender's foreclosure complaint was not yet due in accordance with the agreement for enlargement of time,(2)

  • that the Bank did not timely file the necessary loan documents on which it relied in support of its motion for summary judgment,(3) and

  • that the documents were insufficient to establish that the Bank was the owner and holder of the note and mortgage.(4)

For the court's ruling, see Verrizzo v. Bank of New York, Case No. 2D08-4647 (Fla. Ct. App., 2nd DCA, March 3, 2010).

(1) Last month, it kicked back another foreclosure judgment improperly allowed to go forward by a trial judge. See Florida Appeals Court "Deep-Sixes" Rubber-Stamped Foreclosure Judgment; Kicks Case Back To Trial Court For Further Proceedings.

(2) A motion to enlarge time is a request to extend the amount of time a defendant gets to respond to a lawsuit. Go here for a sample of a Motion to Enlarge Time, and here for links to other useful foreclosure defense documents.

(3) In ruling that the documents were filed late, the appeals court, applied Rule 1.510(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and observed (alteration in the original):

  • Rule 1.510(c) requires that the movant "serve the motion at least 20 days before the time fixed for the hearing[] and shall also serve at that time copies of any summary judgment evidence on which the movant relies that has not already been filed with the court." Further, cases have interpreted the rule to require that the movant also file the motion and documents with the court at least twenty days before the hearing on the motion. See Mack v. Commercial Indus. Park, Inc., 541 So. 2d 800, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Marlar v. Quincy State Bank, 463 So. 2d 1233, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Coastal Caribbean Corp. v. Rawlings, 361 So. 2d 719, 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). The promissory note and assignment constituted a portion of the evidence that the Bank relied on in support of its motion for summary judgment, and it is undisputed that the Bank did not attach those documents to the complaint or serve them at least twenty days before the hearing date. In fact, although the Bank's notice of filing bears a certificate of service indicating that the notice was served on August 18, 2008, the notice and the documents were not actually filed with the court until August 29, 2008, the day of the summary judgment hearing.

(4) In kiboshing the foreclosure judgment on these grounds, the appeals court stated:

  • In addition to the procedural error of the late service and filing of the summary judgment evidence, those documents reflect that at least one genuine issue of material fact exists. The promissory note shows that Novastar endorsed the note to "JPMorgan Chase Bank, as Trustee." Nothing in the record reflects assignment or endorsement of the note by JPMorgan Chase Bank to the Bank of New York or MERS. Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Bank of New York owns and holds the note and has standing to foreclose the mortgage. See Mortgage Electronic Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, 965 So. 2d 151, 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (recognizing that the owner and holder of a note and mortgage has standing to proceed with a mortgage foreclosure action); Philogene v. ABN Amro Mortgage Group, Inc., 948 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (determining that the plaintiff "had standing to bring and maintain a mortgage foreclosure action since it demonstrated that it held the note and mortgage in question").

NY Bankruptcy Court Bounces Bank For Lack Of Standing, Insufficient Documentary Proof Substantiating Debt; Chase Gets 21 Days To File Proper Paperwork

A ruling this week by a New York Federal bankruptcy court bounced, without prejudice,(1) a creditor's claim filed by J.P. Morgan Chase Bank in a Chapter 13 proceeding filed by a homeowner. According to the ruling, Chase both:

  • failed to present evidence necessary to demonstrate that it is either the servicer, note and mortgage holder, or assignee such that it has standing to bring the claim, and

  • failed in meeting its evidentiary burden under the Bankruptcy Code and Rules to substantiate its proof of claim ("Unless a proof of claim is properly executed and filed in accordance with the rules, the proof of claim does not constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim." See FED. RULES. BANKR. PROCEDURE 3001(f)).

The court provides a somewhat lengthy analysis of recent bankruptcy court cases that it considered in reaching its ruling, and discusses the level of documentation required to support the prima facie validity of a mortgagee's claim. The reading is pretty technical, and recommended only for Federal bankruptcy geeks and others who are into this kind of stuff.

For the entire text of the case, see In re: Kerman J. Minbatiwalla, Case No. 09-15693 (USBC S.D. N.Y., March 1, 2010).

(1) The court ruled that the proper creditor may file an amended proof of claim within 21 days of the entry of the court's order. It said that if Chase holds the note and mortgage, it must affix documents to the proof of claim establishing that relationship. Alternatively, if Chase is not the holder, it must give the holder notice of this 21-day deadline and file a declaration with the Court that such notice has been given. The Debtor has 14 days after any amended proof of claim is filed to object.

Sunday, March 7, 2010

New Jersey Bona Fide Purchaser, Possession, Duty To Inquire

The following compilation of cases is an extended version of the list of New Jersey cases contained in the February 1, 2009 post, Bona Fide Purchaser Doctrine, Possession Of Property By Occupants Other Than The Vendor & The Duty To Inquire, that address the issue of the effect of possession by an occupant of real property by one other than the seller/vendor on a prospective purchaser's status as a bona fide purchaser.

As stated in my February 1 post, these cases are presented here to remind the reader of the importance of giving this issue the serious consideration it deserves when attempting to undo/unwind/void an abusive real estate transaction (ie. foreclosure rescue sale leasebacks, fraudulent inducement in the execution of a deed, forgeries, other real estate swindles) where, after scamming or otherwise abusively relieving an unwitting homeowner of his/her title, the scammer either sells the property to an unwitting third party, or encumbers the property with a loan from an unwitting mortgage lender, neither of whom participated in the abusive transaction with the homeowner, nor having any actual knowledge thereof. Voiding the deeds and mortgages in these cases (in situations where the instruments are voidable, as opposed to being absolutely void - "void ab initio") will turn on whether the subsequent third party purchaser or encumbrancer, despite lacking in actual knowledge of the fraud or other abusive transaction, can otherwise be charged with notice of the fraud, thereby making bona fide purchaser/encumbrancer status unavailable to them and, consequently, subjecting the deeds or mortgages to being voided/rescinded/set aside.

(In a related post that addresses the distinction between deeds that are absolutely void (void ab initio), and deeds that are merely voidable, see Unwinding An Abusive Or Fraudulent Real Estate Transaction? Determining If The Deed Is Void, Or Merely Voidable?)

While certainly not purporting to be an exhaustive list of cases dealing with the issue of possession and the duty to inquire when attempting to establish (or attack) one's status as a bona fide purchaser, the following compilation of case law citations specifically address this issue.

One caveat: Any serious consideration of the bona fide purchaser doctrine should, first and foremost, begin with a reading of the state recording statutes, as they are currently constituted. Since there are over 50 jurisdictions in the U.S., each with their own recording statute, I certainly can't address them here (for the New Jersey recording statute, see 46:22-1. Failure to record or register deeds or instruments; effect as to subsequent judgment creditors, purchasers and mortgagees

But after reading your state's recording statutes, you may want to consider how these cases, if at all, fit into making the legal analysis necessary when attempting to undo/unwind/void an abusive real estate transaction by attacking the bona fide purchaser status of a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer/mortgage lender. Keep in mind that, even in the event that the New Jersey state legislature has passed laws subsequent to these court rulings that either modifies or renders them obsolete in New Jersey, the persuasiveness of the logic that underlies them may still be of value to those involved in litigation outside of New Jersey (don't lose sight of the fact that the doctrine of bona fide purchase is not a creature of state statute, but one of English common law, which is the starting point for this doctrine, not only as generally applied in New Jersey, but as generally applied in New Jersey's sister states as well).

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New Jersey Supreme Court

Eckman v. Beihl,116 N.J.L. 308; 184 A. 430 (Sup. Ct. 1936):

  • Possession, in order to constitute notice, must meet a definite standard. In Holmes v. Stout, supra, Chief Justice Green, for the Court of Errors and Appeals, laid down the rule that "suspicion of notice is not sufficient. * * * The inference must be necessary and unquestionable. * * * Every possession will not amount to implied notice. It must be an actual and exclusive possession manifested by notorious acts of ownership, and such as would naturally be observed and known by others. Merely cutting wood, or pasturing cattle on unenclosed woodland, repairing the fences, and even removing an old house standing on part of the land, which may be regarded as mere acts of trespass as well as ownership, have been held insufficient. Nor does even actual open notorious possession of the land necessarily and in all cases create a presumption of notice. * * *." Judge Potts, writing a concurring opinion, in the same case, observed that "occasional acts * * * by pasturing cattle or removing fences, would not be sufficient, unless they were so far continuous that, if done by wrong under a claim of title, they would lose the character of mere trespasses, and acquire that of disseisin." In accord are Hodges Executors v. Ammerman, 40 N.J. Eq. 99; 2 Atl. Rep. 257; Havens v. Bliss, 26 N.J. Eq. 363; Essex County National Bank v. Harrison, 57 N.J. Eq. 91; 40 Atl. Rep. 209; Wood v. Price, 79 N.J. Eq. 620; 81 Atl. Rep. 983. In the last cited case the court held:

    "* * * possession of real estate which is actual, open and visible occupation, inconsistent with the title of the owner by the record and not equivocal, occasional or for a temporary or special purpose, is constructive notice to all the world of the rights of the party in possession."

  • In the case of Coleman v. Barklew, 27 N.J.L. 357, the Supreme Court held on pages 359, 360:

    "* * * It is well settled under the registry acts, that implied notice may be equally effective with direct and positive notice, and that possession by the grantee is, or may be constructive notice of the existence of a prior unregistered deed. But the possession must be actual, distinct, and unequivocal. It must, moreover, be visible, and manifested by notorious acts of ownership, such as would be naturally observed by others.

  • And in the case of McCall v. Yard, 11 N.J. Eq. 58, the court held (at pp. 62, 63):

    "* ** But the purchaser must have notice of the possession before he is bound to inquire into the estate. * * * But if the possession is such as from its very character is not visible and of common report, and would not attract the attention of an observing man, then it is not such a possession as is calculated to provoke inquiry and put a party upon his diligence, and a bona fide purchaser ought not be concluded by it. * * *." Feld v. Kantrowitz, 98 N.J. Eq. 167; 130 Atl. Rep. 6; affirmed, 99 N.J. Eq. 847; 132 Atl. Rep. 657; Clawans v. Ordway B. & L. Assn., 112 N.J. Eq. 280; 164 Atl. Rep. 267 (Court of Errors and Appeals).

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey

Van Roden v. Manso, 115 N.J. Eq. 69; 169 A. 825 (E & A 1934 ): The court quoted from LaCombe v. Headley, 91 N.J. Eq. 63, 108 A. 185, in which it was stated:

  • "It is entirely settled, both in this state and elsewhere, that possession of land, if open, notorious, and unequivocal, constitutes notice of the right, or claim of right, under which the party in possession occupies it; and this notice is effective, not only to those who have actual knowledge of the occupation, but as to all the world.

  • It is the duty of an intending purchaser of land which is in the possession of a person other than the intending grantor to inquire of the occupant, and ascertain the rights under which he holds; and if he does not make such inquiry, he is chargeable with notice of such fact as the inquiry, if it had been in fact made, would have revealed."

Hinners v. Banville, 114 N.J. Eq. 348; 168 A. 618 (E & A 1933):

  • This respondent is chargeable with notice. Stephen Banville, his wife, Rose, and his sister, Helen, were occupants of the mortgaged premises. It is the duty of an intending purchaser of land which is in the possession of a person other than the intending grantor, to inquire of the occupant and ascertain the rights under which he holds; and if he does not make such inquiry, he is chargeable with notice of such facts as the inquiry, if it had been in fact made, would have revealed. LaCombe v. Headley, 91 N.J. Eq. 63, 66, 108 A. 185.

  • The effect of the constructive notice, due to possession, is a notice of everything which a party interested in the premises would get by inquiring of the party in possession. Essex County National Bank v. Harrison, 57 N.J. Eq. 91, 96, 40 A. 209. When facts are brought to the knowledge of the person contemplating the purchase of the record title which are sufficient to apprise him of the existence of an outstanding claim of title, and a reasonable investigation of such facts would necessarily discover the existence of such outstanding title, the purchaser is put upon inquiry, and charged with notice of the facts which a reasonably diligent inquiry would have ascertained.

  • It is also well settled that the open, visible, notorious and exclusive possession of land, by one who is not the record owner, affords a notice to one who purchases the record title which puts such purchaser upon inquiry, and charges him with a knowledge of such facts as a reasonably diligent inquiry would have ascertained. Schwoebel v. Storrie, 76 N.J. Eq. 466, 74 A. 969. The fact of possession is notice of all such matters as a prudent man, desirous of purchasing the property, would naturally inquire about respecting the title. Wood v. Price, 79 N.J. Eq. 620, 627, 81 A. 983.

  • In the last cited case this court held that the prospective purchaser, having ascertained that the possession of the occupant is that of a tenant, would, in the ordinary course of things, proceed to inquire as to the title of the landlord, and that, therefore, the possession of the premises by a tenant is constructive notice not only of such tenant's rights and equities, but as well notice of those of the landlord. See, also, Dele v. Bruning, 101 N.J. Eq. 58, 137 A. 826; affirmed, 105 N.J. Eq. 252, 147 A. 908.

  • In the instant case the possession of the above named appellants was open, notorious and unequivocal, and constituted, therefore, notice of the right, or claim of right, under which they occupied it. This notice is effective not only as to those who have actual knowledge of the occupation, but as to all the world. LaCombe v. Headley, supra. It is admitted that the respondent corporation made no effort to ascertain the rights under which these appellants held possession of the land, and having failed to do so, it is chargeable with notice of such facts as inquiry would have disclosed.

  • It is argued that, because Rose Banville, wife of Stephen, expressed a willingness to pay rent when complainant's husband informed her, on July 1st, 1932, that complainant had acquired title to the property in the foreclosure proceedings, and some of appellants thereafter negotiated for a reconveyance of the property, the right to relief was lost. The vice-chancellor concluded that if the purchaser had made inquiry of the occupants of the lands, the latter "would probably have said that they had been the owners, their title had been foreclosed, they were negotiating for a repurchase, and in the meanwhile were renting the property." This is purely speculative. The presumption is that such inquiry would have disclosed the fact that they had not been served with process in the foreclosure proceedings, and that, for lack of jurisdiction, the decree did not bar their equity of redemption. And the disclosures made would undoubtedly have been sufficient to, at least, put the prospective purchaser upon inquiry as to the outstanding claims of title of the other appellants.

Clawans v. Ordway Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 112 N.J. Eq. 280; 164 A. 267 (E & A 1933): This case involved the imposition of the duty, on a mortgage lender looking to loan money against real estate collateral, to inquire of persons in possession as to their rights in the property:

  • In Wood v. Price, 79 N.J. Eq. 620, 81 A. 983, Mr. Justice Voorhees said (at p. 624): "All authorities are agreed that the general rule is that possession of real estate which is actual, open and visible occupation, inconsistent with the title of the apparent owner by the record and not equivocal, occasional or for a temporary or special purpose, is constructive notice to all the world of the rights of the party in possession."

  • The testimony relating to the complainant's possession, accepted by the trial court as true, was, we think, sufficient to bring that possession within the application of the rule thus stated. It was held by this court in La Combe v. Headley, 91 N.J. Eq. 63, 108 A. 185, opinion by the chief-justice, that: "It is the duty of an intending purchaser of land which is in the possession of a person other than the intending grantor to inquire of the occupant and ascertain the rights under which he holds; and if he does not make such inquiry, he is chargeable with notice of such facts as the inquiry, if it had been in fact made, would have revealed."

  • The efficacy of notice by actual possession applies to a person proposing to take a mortgage on the property. Phelan v. Brady, 119 N.Y. 587, 23 N.E. 1109; Chicago and A. R. Co. v. Kelly, 182 Ill. 267; 54 N.E. 979. The inquiry required to be made of the occupant must, of course, be made with due diligence; and it was not so made in the instant case. Indeed the visitation of the defendant's representatives at the premises seems to have been directed towards the physical condition of the property and not at all towards the character or significance of the occupancy.

LaCombe v. Headley, 91 N.J. Eq. 63; 108 A. 185 (E & A 1919):

  • The statute makes an unrecorded deed void only as against judgment creditors, bona fide purchasers and mortgagees who have no notice thereof, and it is entirely settled, both in this state and elsewhere, that possession of land, if open, notorious and unequivocal, constitutes notice of the right, or claim of right, under which the party in possession occupies it; and this notice is effective, not only as to those who have actual knowledge of the occupation, but as to all the world.

  • It is the duty of an intending purchaser of land which is in the possession of a person other than the intending grantor to inquire of the occupant and ascertain the rights under which he holds; and if he does not make such inquiry, he is chargeable with notice of such facts as the inquiry, if it had been in fact made, would have revealed. Havens v. Bliss, 26 N.J. Eq. 363; Johns v. Norris, 27 N.J. Eq. 485; Hodge v. Amerman, 40 N.J. Eq. 99, 2 A. 257; Wood v. Price, 79 N.J. Eq. 624.

  • In the present case, the fact that this land was in the possession of someone was, as we have already said, obvious. An examination of the wagons stored there would have disclosed the occupant. So, too, would inquiry made in the neighborhood; for the testimony indicates that it was generally known that Mr. LaCombe was using this land in his contracting business. Under the rule stated the defendant for her own protection was required to ascertain the rights under which LaCombe held; she made no effort to do so, and having failed in this regard she is chargeable with notice of what she would have learned had she performed this duty, namely, that LaCombe was in possession of this land under a tax deed made by the tax collector of the town of Irvington in 1909. In this situation she is not within the protection of the statute--that is, she is not a bona fide purchaser without notice of the existence of the LaCombe deed.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division

City of Newark v. Block 1, Lots 1, 3, 902-904 McCarter Highway Breco Realty Co., (unpublished) DOCKET NO. A-3987-07T3, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 910, (App. Div. 2009):

  • Also, anyone who acquires title to property by paying valuable consideration is considered "a bona fide purchaser for value "without notice until the contrary appears." Venetsky v. West Essex Bldg. Supply Co., 28 N.J. Super. 178, 187, 100 A.2d 291 (App. Div. 1953). The burden to prove otherwise is on the party alleging that the purchaser had notice. Ibid. "'[C]onstructive notice may be just as effectual as actual notice, and . . . may arise from possession alone, but, in order to give it that effect, it must be open, notorious, exclusive and unequivocal.'" Michalski v. United States, 49 N.J. Super. 104, 108, 139 A.2d 324 (Ch. Div. 1958) (quoting Hodge's Executors v. Amerman, 40 N.J. Eq. 99, 103, 2 A. 257 (Ch. 1885)).

  • However, this possession must involve acts that are "open and notorious acts of ownership as will naturally be observed by others, and the acts must be of a character so certain and definite in denoting ownership as not to be liable to be misunderstood or misconstrued." Ibid. (quoting Hodge's, supra, 40 N.J. Eq. at 103). If such acts occur, then a bona fide purchaser has a "duty to inquire of the one in possession concerning the right by which he occupies the premises and been held bound by knowledge which such inquiry would have revealed." Id. at 109.

Left Field Props., L.L.C. v. James F. Keeney, L.L.C., DOCKET NO. A-3300-03T1, DOCKET NO. A-6743-03T1, 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 75, (App Div. 2006):

  • We have held that "[c]onstructive notice may be brought home to a mortgagee by known circumstances." Howard v. Diolosa, 241 N.J. Super. 222, 232, 574 A.2d 995 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 414, 585 A.2d 409 (1990). "If a purchaser or lienor is faced with extraordinary, suspicious, and unusual facts which should prompt an inquiry, it is equivalent to notice of the fact in question." Ibid. Exclusive possession must be inconsistent with record title and open and notorious. Michalski v. United States, 49 N.J. Super. 104, 108-9, 139 A.2d 324 (Ch. Div. 1958).

Martinique Realty Corp. v. Hull, 64 N.J. Super. 599; 166 A.2d 803 (App. Div. 1960):

  • Plaintiff, the purchaser of a leasehold interest in a 55-apartment building in Passaic, commenced this suit against the tenants of one of the apartments for damages for the nonpayment of rent allegedly due and owing under the terms of a five-year written lease. Defendants asserted the defense of payment, claiming that the entire rent for the term of the lease had been paid in advance to the former lessor, plaintiff's vendor, and that plaintiff purchased subject to all of defendants' rights as lessees. No basic facts being in issue, the Law Division granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff was chargeable with notice of defendants' rights in and to the apartment, as created between defendants and plaintiff's assignor. Plaintiff files the instant appeal from that determination.

***

  • Plaintiff's contention on this appeal is two-fold. It argues, first, that as the transferee of the leasehold interest, it was entitled to the benefit of all of the covenants between its predecessor and the Hulls. Secondly, it urges that it had a right to rely upon the terms of defendants' lease as written, and that the prepayment of rent is therefore no bar as such prepayment was inconsistent with the terms of the lease; further, that it had no notice, at the time of purchase, of defendants' advance payments, and that it was not, under the principle of Feld v. Kantrowitz, 98 N.J. Eq. 167 (Ch. 1925), affirmed 99 N.J. Eq. 847 (E. & A. 1926), and 99 N.J. Eq. 706 (Ch. 1926), required to make inquiry of each tenant as to the latter's interest in the property outside of the written lease. Defendants respond by questioning the applicability of the Feld case, arguing that plaintiff was under a duty to make inquiry respecting the rights of lessees under their tenancies and that failure to make such inquiry charges plaintiff with notice of such rights. They further contend that the payment of rent by a tenant to his landlord in advance of the time stipulated in the lease for its payment is a discharge pro tanto from the claim of the lessor, and therefore a valid defense against the assignee of the lessor's interest.

  • Plaintiff is confronted at the outset by the specific statutory provision that the rights of a lessee of real estate for a term of years vis-a-vis his lessor survive the passing of the lessor's interest to another by assignment or otherwise. R.S. 46:8-3; 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 44(2), p. 567. This is but an illustration of the general rule that the assignee of a contract right takes subject to all defenses valid against his assignor. N.J.S. 2A:25-1. While it may be contended that the applicability of these sections is limited by the penalties inherent in our recording act, R.S. 46:22-1 et seq., embracing leases for a term exceeding two years, N.J.S.A. 46:16-1(a), the statute requires, however, that the prevailing purchaser be bona fide in nature.

  • An essential characteristic of the bona fide purchaser is his lack of notice of the interest of the unrecorded or late-recorded party. It is long settled that the purchaser of a lessor's interest in property has a duty to make inquiry as to the extent of the rights of any person in open, notorious and exclusive possession of the premises; if this duty is not discharged, then notice is imputed to the purchaser of all facts which a reasonably prudent inquiry would have revealed. Holmes v. Stout, 10 N.J. Eq. 419, 426 (E. & A. 1855); Wood v. Price, 79 N.J. Eq. 620, 624 (E. & A. 1911); LaCombe v. Headley, 91 N.J. Eq. 63 (E. & A. 1919); Hinners v. Banville, 114 N.J. Eq. 348, 356 (E. & A. 1933); Zurick v. Perlmutter, 94 N.J.L. 328, 330 (Sup. Ct. 1920); McCall v. Yard, 11 N.J. Eq. 58, 62 (Ch. 1853); Serafin v. Wolff, 5 N.J. Super. 386, 390-391 (App. Div. 1949). See American Law of Property, § 17.12, pp. 574-78. 55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, § 712, pp. 1087-88, § 720, p. 1093. Such inquiry must be made of the tenant in possession, and if inquiry is made only of the former lessor, the tenant will not be precluded from asserting against the purchaser such rights as he possessed against the lessor. Arcade Realty Holding Corp. v. Hildinger, 6 N.J. Misc. 1055, 1058, 144 A. 25 (Ch. 1928).

  • Moreover, it has been held, in a situation strikingly parallel to the one at hand, that the duty of inquiry is not discharged when an intending purchaser of a leasehold merely examines the written lease which the occupant has signed with the owner of record. The purchaser assumes at his peril that the instrument accurately defines the rights of the occupant. Caplan v. Palace Realty Co., N.J., 110 A. 584 (Ch. 1920). Vice-Chancellor Leaming stated unequivocally in the latter case that

  • "If the purchaser is content to rely upon the representations of the landlord, either express or implied, to the effect that the writing contains * * * an accurate statement of the terms actually agreed upon, and fails to inquire of the tenant touching those facts * * * the purchaser's rights as against the tenant can rise no higher than those which were in fact enjoyed by the landlord under that instrument and any right of reformation of the instrument for fraud or mistake which the tenant may have enjoyed against the landlord may in like manner be enjoyed against the purchaser." (110 A., at p. 585.)

  • Plaintiff contends, however, that the duty of inquiry has been severely restricted, if not eliminated entirely, in cases involving a multi-tenanted office or apartment building. Reliance is placed exclusively on the opinions in Feld v. Kantrowitz, supra. There, an attorney, a tenant in a small office building, claimed that he had acquired, under an unrecorded assignment, an option to purchase a one-sixth interest in the building. The defendant, who had entered into a contract to purchase the entire property without notice of plaintiff's option and without making inquiry of the tenant, claimed status as a bona fide purchaser and asserted that defendant's unrecorded option was extinguished. The vice-chancellor took cognizance of the doctrine of inquiry notice but held that it did not apply to the situation before him. He reasoned that since an office building or apartment house is constructed for the very purpose of creating numerous tenancies, a purchaser should be able to assume that the occupants of the offices or apartments possess the designated status of tenants. Therefore, he concluded, "under these circumstances, to charge a prospective purchaser with notice of any right, title, or interest of one of the tenants, beyond the right of tenancy would be absurd." (98 N.J. Eq., supra, at p. 169). He further discussed the rule that to put the purchaser on inquiry notice, the tenant must be in exclusive possession, and concluded that the interest of one of numerous tenants of a large building does not satisfy the exclusivity requirement. The vice-chancellor's decision was affirmed on the sole ground that he had applied the proper procedural principles in denying plaintiff a preliminary injunction; the Court of Errors and Appeals expressly disclaimed any examination of the merits of the litigation. 99 N.J. Eq. 847, 849 (E. & A. 1926). Subsequently, the cause came on for final hearing, at which time the vice-chancellor reiterated his position, further stating that Caplan v. Palace Realty Co., supra, "does not, so far as my reading of the opinion reveals, refer in any way to the constructive notice arising from tenancy in a building such as the one involved in the case at bar." 99 N.J. Eq., supra, at p. 707.

  • The precise holding in Feld would seem to be clearly distinguishable from the instant fact situation in that defendants are not herein asserting any interest "beyond the right of tenancy," that is, beyond a demand for recognition of the precise terms of their tenancy. To apply Feld to the instant situation would be to contravene the general rule that possession and occupancy of the premises by the tenant amount to notice of his advance payment of rent, and that such prepayment -- honestly made, and in the absence of special circumstances putting the tenant on notice that he is prejudicing the rights of third parties -- will protect the tenant against further liability for such rent to the landlord and all successors to his interest. 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 535, p. 348; 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, § 461, p. 378. Boteler v. Leber, 112 N.J. Eq. 441 (Ch. 1933), cited by plaintiff, is not opposed to this view. The court in Boteler left open the question of whether notice would affect the rights of the parties. Furthermore, the lease was expressly subordinated to the mortgage, thereby insulating the mortgagee's rights to the rents upon default.

  • On the other hand, we cannot in all candor overlook indications in the language of Feld broad enough to encompass the instant case, namely: (1) the vice-chancellor's statement (98 N.J. Eq., supra, at p. 172), that he might decide differently if "dealing with the right of a tenant as such, even in this kind of a building, that appears in his lease." (Emphasis added) Evidence of the prepayment of the Hulls did not, as we have noted, appear in their lease; and (2) the attempt to distinguish the Caplan case on the ground that a multi-tenanted building was not there involved, leaving the implication that the purchaser of such a building can justifiably rely exclusively on the tenants' leases as written.

  • We must therefore consider, to the extent it bears on the present appeal, the question which we left open in Schnakenberg v. Gibraltar Savings and Loan Ass'n, 37 N.J. Super. 150, 158 (App. Div. 1955): "Whether the rights of a tenant in possession and the duties of a purchaser of realty vary with the size and character of the building * * *."

  • At least with respect to the details of a tenant's leasehold arrangement with his landlord, we are convinced that the purchaser's duty of inquiry does not vary with the number of tenants occupying the property. The arguments advanced in favor of such a correspondence are of dubious validity. Inquiry notice is an equitable doctrine designed to effect a distribution of precautionary burdens in a situation involving two "innocent" parties. American Law of Property, § 17.11, pp. 565-66. We see little merit in plaintiff's insistence that it would be exceedingly onerous to require inquiry of every tenant in a multi-tenanted building. The statement in Feld, 98 N.J. Eq., supra, at p. 169, that it "would be absurd" to hold that "one contemplating the purchase of one of the great office buildings in the metropolitan district would be under a duty to personally interview every one of the hundreds of tenants occupying the offices thereof" ignores the very practical and effective device of the written communication. The duty to inquire is discharged by the exercise of due diligence or reasonable prudence, see Clawans v. Ordway B. & L. Ass'n, 112 N.J. Eq. 280, 284 (E. & A. 1933), and what such an inquiry fails to reveal is not further protected by the mere continued possession of the tenant. 4 American Law of Property, § 17.12, p. 576. Under certain circumstances, written inquiry may be sufficient to discharge that duty.

  • We need not dwell upon the statement in Feld that no single occupant of a multi-tenanted building is in such exclusive possession as to warrant the invoking of the purchaser's duty of inquiry. For the period of his lease, the lessee is considered the exclusive owner and occupier of the demised premises. Longi v. Raymond-Commerce Corp., 34 N.J. Super. 593, 600 (App. Div. 1955). That the demised premises consist of one apartment rather than an entire building should not be of consequence. This is not a situation involving the interests of the various family occupants of a single house. See Rankin v. Coar, 46 N.J. Eq. 566 (E. & A. 1890); Annotation, 2 A.L.R.2d 857 (1948). Each apartment in the building under consideration is an entirely separate habitational unit, evidenced by a separate landlord-tenant arrangement.

  • We expressly refrain from a determination as to whether a purchaser's duty of inquiry extends to collateral interests of the lessee which are independent of his tenancy. We note, however, that the majority rule appears to extend the inquiry notice doctrine to cover certain collateral interests of the lessee, such as an option to purchase, see Annotations, 17 A.L.R.2d 331 (1951), 37 A.L.R.2d 1112 (1954), though perhaps not a claim of ownership of the fee. See Annotation, 74 A.L.R. 355, 357 (1931). In any event, plaintiff, having failed to fulfill its duty of inquiry with respect to defendants' rights under their tenancy, is subject to the prior effective discharge by the latter of their rental obligations. Caplan v. Palace Realty Co., supra.

  • Judgment affirmed.

Schnakenberg v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Asso., 37 N.J. Super. 150; 117 A.2d 191 (App. Div. 1955):

  • The complaint alleges that on March 1, 1946, prior to the conveyance of title by the Sinnigens to Gibraltar, the plaintiff entered into open and exclusive possession of the premises. It has long been settled that under such circumstances it is the duty of a purchaser to inquire of the person in possession of the premises and ascertain the rights under which he holds, and if this duty of inquiry be disregarded, the purchaser is chargeable with notice of such facts as the inquiry, if it had been in fact made, would have revealed, and the possession of the tenant amounts to notice of his rights, not merely under the lease, but also under collateral agreements, including the right to renew the lease. Wood v. Price, 79 N.J. Eq. 620 (E. & A. 1911); Zurick v. Perlmutter, 94 N.J.L. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Serafin v. Wolff, 5 N.J. Super. 386 (App. Div. 1949).

  • In Feld v. Kantrowitz, 98 N.J. Eq. 167 (Ch. 1925), id., 99 N.J. Eq. 706 (Ch. 1926), affirmed 99 N.J. Eq. 847 (E. & A. 1926), it was indicated that the constructive notice did not extend to the claim of a tenant in a small office building to an assignment of an undivided one-sixth interest in and to the premises. Vice-Chancellor Bentley distinguished between constructive notice chargeable to a purchaser where the tenant is in unequivocal and exclusive possession of the entire premises and where the tenant is one of a considerable number in an office building. Whether the rights of a tenant in possession and the duties of a purchaser of realty vary with the size and character of the building, we are not called upon to, and do not, decide. Here, the tenant is in sole and exclusive possession of almost the entire premises.

  • Reformation does not lie against a subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice. Flaacke v. The Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 28 N.J. Eq. 110 (Ch. 1877), affirmed 30 N.J. Eq. 733 (E. & A. 1879). But in a situation where the purchaser is chargeable with constructive notice, any right of reformation of the instrument for fraud or mistake which the tenant has against the landlord may in like manner be enforced against the purchaser. Caplan v. Palace Realty Co., 110 A. 584 (Ch. 1920).

Serafin v. Wolff, 5 N.J. Super. 386; 69 A.2d 347 (App. Div. 1949):

  • The leading case in our State is Wood v. Price, 79 N.J. Eq. 620 (E. & A. 1911), in which the court said at p. 624:

    "All authorities are agreed that the general rule is that possession of real estate which is actual, open and visible occupation, inconsistent with the title of the apparent owner by the record and not equivocal, occasional or for a temporary or special purpose, is constructive notice to all the world of the rights of the party in possession. "This agreement of the authorities also extends to include those equities of one who occupies as tenant that are connected with the tenancy, as the contents of and the covenents contained in the lease, and as well to interests under collateral agreements, as a contract to convey the land, or to renew the lease, etc. * * * "Now, it is the duty of a purchaser to inquire of the person in possession of the premises and ascertain the rights under which he holds, and if this duty of inquiry be disregarded, the purchaser is chargeable with notice of such facts as the inquiry, if it had been in fact made, would have revealed."

  • We think the exclusive, open and visible possession of the tenant is constructive notice to a purchaser of a collateral agreement such as this. It thus became the duty of the purchaser to inquire of the tenant and ascertain the rights under which he held. Since the purchaser failed to do this, he is chargeable with notice of such facts relating to the agreement as inquiry, if it had been made, would have revealed. Cf. Zurick v. Perlmutter, 94 N.J.L. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1920); 74 A.L.R. 355, 356, 360.

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Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery/Law Divisions


Michalski v. United States, 49 N.J. Super. 104; 139 A.2d 324; 1958 N.J. Super. LEXIS 533 (1958):

  • The decision turns on a question of notice. The applicable statute N.J.S.A. 46:22-1 provides:

    "Every deed or instrument of the nature or description set forth in 46:16-1 of this title shall, until duly recorded or lodged for record in the office of the county recording officer in which the affected real estate or other property is situate, be void and of no effect against subsequent judgment creditors without notice, and against all subsequent bona fide purchasers and mortgagees for valuable consideration, not having notice thereof, whose deed shall have been first duly recorded or whose mortgage shall have been first duly recorded or registered; but any such deed or instrument shall be valid and operative, although not recorded, except as against such subsequent judgment creditors, purchasers and mortgagees." (Italics ours)

  • Preliminarily it may be said that the settled law of the State is that whatever is sufficient to charge a purchaser with constructive notice is sufficient to charge a judgment creditor with the same. Lewis v. Hall, 7 N.J. Eq. 107, 120 (Ch. 1848); H.C. Tack Co. v. Ayers, 56 N.J. Eq. 56 (Ch. 1897); Majewski v. Greenberg, 101 N.J. Eq. 134, 138 (Ch. 1927).

  • Although the doctrine of constructive notice is touched upon in Diehl v. Page, 3 N.J. Eq. 143 (Ch. 1834); Losey v. Simpson, 11 N.J. Eq. 246 (Ch. 1856); Havens v. Bliss, 26 N.J. Eq. 363 (Ch. 1875); Cooke v. Watson, 30 N.J. Eq. 345, 352 (Ch. 1879), and Wanner v. Sisson, 29 N.J. Eq. 141, 150 (Ch. 1878), the earliest definitive discussion of the principle in this State appears in Hodge's Ex'rs v. Amerman, 40 N.J. Eq. 99, 103 (Ch. 1885). Hodge purchased a tract of meadow land from Polhemus in 1871, failing to record the deed thereto until December 1883, ten months subsequent to the recovery by the defendants of a judgment against Polhemus. In pertinent effect the statute then in force, was the same as that presently involved. The court, in enjoining the enforcement of the judgment against Hodge's land, said:

    "Now, it is well settled in cases of this kind that implied or constructive notice may be just as effectual as actual notice, and that constructive notice may arise from possession alone, but, in order to give it that effect, it must be open, notorious, exclusive and unequivocal. It need not be by actual residence on the land, but where there is no actual pedis possessio, dominion must be manifested by such open and notorious acts of ownership as will naturally be observed by others, and the acts must be of a character so certain and definite in denoting ownership as not to be liable to be misunderstood or misconstrued. Holmes v. Stout, 2 Stock. [10 N.J. Eq.], 419; Coleman v. Barklew. 3 Dutch [27 N.J.L.], 357; 4 Kent's Com. 172; 2 Lead. Cas. in Eq. (4th Am. ed.) 180. But it is not necessary, in order to establish the fact of notice in such cases, to show that the person to be affected by the notice knew of the possession of the other. If the possession of the other is of the character required by the law -- if his possession has the notoriety, certainty and exclusiveness which the law says shall constitute notice -- then notice is a legal deduction from the fact of possession, and all persons dealing with the title to the land in his possession are chargeable with notice of his possession, whether they have actual knowledge of his possession or not. The reason of the rule is this: That it is the duty of a person, who proposes to deal respecting the title to a particular tract of land, to ascertain, in advance, who is in possession of it, and by what right he claims to hold it, and if he neglects this duty, it is only just that he should be charged with the knowledge that he would have obtained had he performed it. 2 Lead. Cas. in Eq. (4th Am. ed.) 180; Rogers v. Jones, 8 N.H. 264; Wickes v. Lake, 25 Wis. 71; Buck v. Holloway ['s Devisees], 2 J.J. Marsh. 163; Billington ['s Lessee] v. Welsh. 5 Bin. 129; Boggs v. Varner, 6 Watts & S. [Pa.], 469."

  • In Gardom v. Chester, 60 N.J. Eq. 238, 244 (Ch. 1900), a case factually analogous to this case, it was held that occupation of the premises by the plaintiff for seven months before the defendant recovered a judgment against her grantor afforded the defendant "abundant notice that she was in possession as owner, and the least inquiry made of [her] would have disclosed her unrecorded deed." See also Wood v. Price, 79 N.J. Eq. 620 (E. & A. 1911).

  • And so to the present day in every reported case in this State in which exclusive possession inconsistent with the record has been open and notorious has the judgment creditor, bona fide purchaser or mortgagee been charged with a duty to inquire of the one in possession concerning the right by which he occupies the premises and been held bound by the knowledge which such inquiry would have revealed. See LaCombe v. Headley, 91 N.J. Eq. 63, 66 (E. & A. 1919); Majewski v. Greenberg, above, 101 N.J. Eq., at page 138. Only in those cases in which the unrecorded owner has not been in actual possession has relief been denied him in the circumstances with which we are confronted. Vide, H.C. Tack Co. v. Ayers, supra; Gawrillow v. Rutkowski, 104 N.J. Eq. 329, 330 (Ch. 1929).

  • But the question presented is this: Was the sole occupancy of the premises by the plaintiffs inconsistent with the record title of co-tenancy with the Guerrieros? Neither counsel nor the court has come upon any case in this jurisdiction which deals with this precise problem. However, the proposition has received judicial consideration in other jurisdictions.

  • In Weisberger v. Wisner, 55 Mich. 246, 21 N.W. 331, 332 (Sup. Ct. 1884), a foreclosure action in which it appeared that the defendant co-tenant held a larger interest in the property involved than shown by the record title, by reason of an unrecorded sale to him of his co-tenants interest prior to the time the latter mortgaged it to the plaintiff, the court held:

    "It is true, as complainant says, that the possession was not apparently inconsistent with the record title; * * * and if that were sufficient reason for holding that the possession is no notice of actual rights, the principle on which decisions have been made, giving protection to occupants, would have very limited application * * *. It seems to be unquestionable that Wisner occupied exclusively, and White would have learned this fact on inquiry. No reason is apparent why he should not have been held bound to inquire, as much in this case as in any other."

  • In Schmidt v. Steinbach, 193 Mich. 640, 160 N.W. 448 (Sup. Ct. 1916), it was held that the actual possession by a tenant in common is sufficient to put another on inquiry and the other is chargeable with knowledge of all the facts which he might have learned in making inquiry of the party in possession, citing Weisberger v. Wisner, supra. The same rule was adopted in Peck v. Williams, 113 Ind. 256, 15 N.E. 270 (Sup. Ct. 1888), wherein the court said that where one tenant in common has purchased and paid for the interest of his co-tenant and has taken exclusive possession of what was theretofore the common estate and made lasting and valuable improvements thereon, before the lien of a judgment attaches a judgment creditor who purchases the apparent interest of the tenant who has sold will be affected with notice of the rights of the tenant in possession. This holding was reiterated in Kirkham v. Moore, 30 Ind. App. 549, 65 N.E. 1042 (App. Div. 1903).

  • I am satisfied that the sole and exclusive possession of the plaintiffs for a period of seven years made manifest a sufficient inconsistency between occupancy and record title to call upon the judgment creditors to make inquiry with respect to the state of the title notwithstanding the fact of the recorded showing of co-tenancy. Indubitably such inquiry of the plaintiffs would have revealed their status as sole owners. In these circumstances the defendants were chargeable with constructive notice of the nature and extent of the plaintiffs' interest at the time the judgments were recovered and so the property is declared to be free and clear of the resultant liens.

McLaren v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 1 N.J. Super. 600; 63 A.2d 922 (1948):

  • As an instrument affecting the title to real estate or any interest therein or granting any right or interest therein, R.S. 46:16-1 & 2, it was void and of no effect against subsequent bona fide purchasers not having notice thereof until duly recorded or lodged for record in the office of the county recording officer in which the affected real estate is situate, R.S. 46:22-1. The key words are "not having notice thereof."

  • Possession or occupation of land, to be effectual as notice must be exclusive and uninterrupted, open, notorious and visible, i.e., it must indicate the occupant; it must indicate that someone other than he who appears by the record to be the owner has rights in the premises. Cox v. Devinney, 65 N.J.L. 389, 47 Atl. Rep. 569. Whatever is sufficient to put a party on inquiry is good notice.

  • The rule is the same at law as in equity and the ground upon which the title acquired by a prior registry of a deed is lost in the case of notice to the second grantee of the existence of the prior conveyance is that it is a fraud in the second grantee to take a deed knowing or having reason to suspect the existence of a prior title. Holmes v. Stout, 10 N.J. Eq. 419. The plaintiffs had constructive notice of the prior rights of the defendant. Since October 1923 when the poles were erected, the defendant's occupation of the strip of land upon which the poles were erected was exclusive and uninterrupted, open, notorious and visible. The presence of the poles, the wires, cables, guys and anchors as a part of a communication system indicated that someone other than he who appeared by the record to be the owner had rights in the premises. The visible presence of the poles and wires was sufficient to put the plaintiffs upon inquiry to determine whether the defendant or some other similar company had the right to erect and maintain the telephone lines. The occupation of the strip of land by the defendant was as exclusive as the circumstances of the case would permit. The plaintiffs took title to the premises in question with notice of the defendant's rights and subject thereto. The failure of the defendant to record the instrument does not affect its rights in the circumstances.

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Court of Chancery of New Jersey

Feld v. Kantrowitz, 98 N.J. Eq. 167; 130 A. 6 (Ch. 1925):

  • The rule of constructive notice created by possession of real property grew up at a time prior to the developing of the rather perfect recording statute that now exists in this state. It was said that fraud is the true ground in cases involving the doctrine of notice. LeNeve v. LeNeve, 1 Ves. 64. The same authority lays down the rule that it is fraudulent to get in the legal estate when it is known that the right was in another. So it has come to be the settled rule that open, notorious, visible, unequivocal, exclusive and uninterrupted possession is notice, and puts a purchaser dealing with the record owner under a duty of inquiry and constitutes constructive notice of everything he would have learned by inquiry from the person in possession. Wood v. Price, 79 N.J. Eq. 620, 81 A. 983. The authority just named, I think, puts New Jersey in the category of jurisdictions that have carried the notice implied from possession and occupation of land to its logical conclusion. But this rule, like any other, is to be applied, not blindly, but according to the surrounding circumstances affecting the rationale of the doctrine of notice.

  • In the case at bar there is not the simple transaction of the purchase of a dwelling-house or a farm or a piece of woodland with someone in visible occupation or possession thereof, but presents the case of a building constructed to accommodate a considerable number of tenants, and which, in fact, was so occupied. The very purpose of the building is to permit the leasing of suites or stores to a number of independent persons and from the rent so acquired to establish an income for the owner. Under these circumstances to charge a prospective purchaser with notice of any right, title or interest of one of the tenants, beyond the right of tenancy would be absurd. While not so large or occupied by so many, I think that it might as well be said that one contemplating the purchase of one of the great office buildings in the metropolitan district would be under a duty to personally interview every one of the hundreds of tenants occupying the offices thereof. Can it be said that the rule should be extended to cover the purchase of a large hotel?

  • The correct statement of the doctrine under consideration discloses that by the authorities, as well as common sense, it was never intended that the rule should be extended to cover a situation such as the present one. Professor Pomeroy, in his Eq. Jur. § 620, says that for one to successfully impute notice to a subsequent grantee or encumbrancer "his possession must be an actual, open, distinct, notorious and exclusive occupancy of the land in question. No mere occupation of the premises in common or in connection with a third person, and no mere exercise of acts of ownership equivocal in their nature over the land will then suffice." Every author and every well-written opinion accentuates the fact that only exclusive and unequivocal possession will satisfy the rule. To like effect is Coleman v. Barklew, 27 N.J.L. 357, where it is said that the possession "must be actual, distinct and unequivocal. It must, moreover, be visible and manifested by notorious acts of ownership. Holmes v. Stout, 3 Gr. Ch. 492," and other authorities.

  • In Cox v. Devinney, 65 N.J.L. 389, 47 A. 569, the chief-justice, in dealing with the present subject, said as follows: "While the general rule is that possession of land is notice to a purchaser of the possessor's right therein, nevertheless such possession, to be effectual as notice, must be not only exclusive and uninterrupted, it must also be open, notorious and visible."

  • In Rankin v. Coar, 46 N.J. Eq. 566, 22 A. 177, the owner of an ordinary dwelling-house died intestate, and, subsequently, his widow released her dower to the only heir, and the same was recorded. Contemporaneously, the heir entered into an agreement with his mother, in writing, that she should have the use and occupation for life of the rooms then occupied by her in the premises aforesaid. This agreement was not recorded. Subsequently, the son executed a mortgage upon the property, and the mortgagee foreclosed. At the sale, under the fi. fa., the widow gave notice of her claim, and, subsequently, she filed a petition in the cause to have the rooms so occupied by her declared to be hers during her life by force of the agreement mentioned.

  • The court of errors and appeals, unanimously reversing this court, held that her possession of the rooms then in question did not come within the true meaning of the doctrine: "Possession, to give notice or to make inquiry a duty, must be open, notorious and unequivocal. There must be such an occupation of the premises as a man of ordinary prudence, treating for the acquisiton of some interest therein, would observe, and, observing, would perceive to be inconsistent with the right of him with whom he was treating, and so be led to inquiry."

  • To the same effect is Holmes v. Stout, 4 N.J. Eq. 492; affirmed, 10 N.J. Eq. 419.

Schwoebel v. Storrie, 76 N.J. Eq. 466; 74 A. 969 (Ch. 1909):

  • The notice contemplated by the recording statute as sufficient to defeat its protection to a subsequent purchaser need not, in itself, apprise the purchaser of all the facts touching the outstanding title. When facts are brought to the knowledge of the person contemplating the purchase of the record title which are sufficient to appraise him of the existence of an outstanding claim of title, and a reasonable investigation of such facts would necessarily discover the existence of such outstanding title, the purchaser is put upon inquiry and charged with notice of the facts which a reasonably diligent inquiry would have ascertained. It is also well settled that the open, visible, notorious and exclusive possession of land by one who is not the record owner affords a notice to one who purchases the record title which puts such purchaser upon inquiry and charges him with a knowledge of such facts as a reasonably diligent inquiry would have ascertained. Diehl v. Page, 3 N.J. Eq. 143, 145; Van Keuren v. Central Railway Co., 38 N.J.L. 165, 167; Havens v. Bliss, 26 N.J. Eq. 363, 370; Johns v. Norris, 27 N.J. Eq. 485, 487; Wanner v. Sisson, 29 N.J. Eq. 141, 150; Cooke v. Watson, 30 N.J. Eq. 345, 352; Essex County Bank v. Harrison, 57 N.J. Eq. 91, 96, 40 A. 209; see, also, 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 614, 615; 2 Dev. Deeds §§ 760, 777.

  • The rule as stated in Allen v. Seckham, 11 Ch. Div. 790, 795, is: "Where a person purchases property where a visible state of things exists which could not legally exist without the property being subject to some burden, he is taken to have notice of the extent and nature of the burden."

Gardom v. Chester, 60 N.J. Eq. 238; 46 A. 602 (Ch. 1900):

  • In this case the property consists of a dwelling-house and town lot at a New Jersey seaside resort. The complainant used it as her residence, paid the taxes assessed upon it, without dispute or denial of her right by anyone. She testifies that she personally occupied the house all the time that she did not have to work in the city to make her living. Her daughter also personally occupied it under her mother's title.

  • These personal uses of the premises were shown to have been quite frequent during all the seasons of the year, at intervals sometimes of a week or two, and sometimes of longer periods. At seaside resorts occupation of residences in this way is very common. The population of such places increases tenfold in the summer time and decreases in the same proportion when the season is concluded.

  • Hundreds of dwelling-houses are there held empty during nine months of the year, to be occupied only during the three summer months. No one deals with such property expecting an owner to have it continually personally occupied. The proofs show that the complainant's personal presence on the premises, in addition to her stay in the summer season, extended over other periods of the year.

  • The presence of the dwelling-house itself, with its curtains in the windows and other signs of personal use--the pump in the yard and the outhouse--were effectual to give notice of an actual possession by those who lived there, whether during every hour of the day they were personally on the premises or not. In Losey v. Simpson, 11 N.J. Eq. 246, 255, Chancellor Williamson held that the actual occupancy of one claiming adversely to the record title imposed upon the other claiming under it the duty of inquiring of the party in possession of the premises of what his right of possession consisted. Vice-Chancellor Pitney, in Essex County Bank v. Harrison, 57 N.J. Eq. 91, 96, 40 A. 209, states the same rule even more forcibly in favor of the party in possession, and cites the New Jersey cases on the point.

  • The occupation of the premises in question by Mrs. Gardom for seven months before the Browning judgment was entered afforded the plaintiff in that judgment abundant notice that she was in possession as owner, and the least inquiry made of Mrs. Gardom would have disclosed the existence of her unrecorded deed.

Hodge's Excrs. v. Amerman, 40 N.J. Eq. 99, 104, 2 A. 257 (Ch. 1885):

  • Now, it is well settled in cases of this kind that implied or constructive notice may be just as effectual as actual notice, and that constructive notice may arise from possession alone, but, in order to give it that effect, it must be open, notorious, exclusive and unequivocal.

  • It need not be by actual residence on the land, but where there is no actual pedis possessio, dominion must be manifested by such open and notorious acts of ownership as will naturally be observed by others, and the acts must be of a character so certain and definite in denoting ownership as not to be liable to be misunderstood or misconstrued. Holmes v. Stout, 10 N.J. Eq. 419; Coleman v. Barklew, 27 N.J.L. 357; 4 Kent's Com. 172; 2 Lead. Cas. in Eq. (4th Am. ed.) 180.

  • But it is not necessary, in order to establish the fact of notice in such cases, to show that the person to be affected by the notice knew of the possession of the other. If the possession of the other is of the character required by the law--if his possession has the notoriety, certainty and exclusiveness which the law says shall constitute notice--then notice is a legal deduction from the fact of possession, and all persons dealing with the title to the land in his possession are chargeable with notice of his possession, whether they have actual knowledge of his possession or not.

  • The reason of the rule is this: That it is the duty of a person, who proposes to deal respecting the title to a particular tract of land, to ascertain, in advance, who is in possession of it, and by what right he claims to hold it, and if he neglects this duty it is only just that he should be charged with the knowledge that he would have obtained had he performed it. 2 Lead. Cas. in Eq. (4th Am. ed.) 180; Rogers v. Jones, 8 N.H. 264; Wickes v. Lake, 25 Wis. 71; Buck v. Holloway, 25 Ky. 163, 2 J.J. Marsh. 163; Billington v. Welsh, 5 Binn. 129; Boggs v. Varner, 6 Watts & Serg. 469.

Recent Cases

I.E.'s, L.L.C. v. Simmons, Docket No. F-13336-03, 392 N.J. Super. 520; 921 A.2d 483; 2006 N.J. Super. Lexis 352 (Superior Court Of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, 2006):

  • New Jersey law has long recognized that a bona fide purchaser for value of real estate who purchases the property knowing others are in possession of the property has a duty to make reasonable and diligent inquiry of the rights to the property by those in possession. Hinners v. Banville, 114 N.J. Eq. 348, 168 A. 618 (E. & A.1933). Hinners is a mortgage foreclosure case where owners were served by publication. The property was sold at a sheriff's sale and then purportedly sold to a bona fide purchaser for value. The sale to the bona fide purchaser for value was set aside since the family was in possession of the property, and the court held that the bona fide purchaser for value had a duty to make a reasonable investigation of the rights of the party in possession. Id. at 356-57, 168 A. 618. See also, Michalski v. U.S., 49 N.J. Super. 104, 108-09, 139 A.2d 324 (Ch.Div.1958).