Another Alleged HAMP Violation, Another HAMP Lawsuit

In Victoria, Texas, the Victoria Advocate reports:

• A Victoria woman is suing BAC Home Loan Servicing over the wrongful foreclosure of her home. Plaintiff Patricia Garcia originally filed the lawsuit in state court in February. It was re-filed in federal court on March 18.(1)

• Garcia claims BAC, whose principal office is in Plano, committed fraud and trespassed on her homestead title when they not only wrongfully foreclosed on her house, but they also sold it to the Federal National Mortgage Association, aka "Fannie Mae."

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• In the lawsuit, Garcia claimed BAC committed fraud because they not only proceeded to foreclose upon her homestead before they evaluated her HAMP eligibility,(2) but they were also without legal right to sell her home to Fannie Mae when it was sold, making the sale void.

• Federal law prohibits mortgage servicers participating in HAMP from referring a loan for foreclosure or proceeding with a foreclosure sale on a qualifying loan until a homeowner, who has applied for a modification under HAMP, has been evaluated and, if deemed eligible, offered a trial modification, according to the lawsuit.

• Garcia is seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale(3) and quiet her title to the homestead, re-establishing her as the rightful owner of the property. Additionally, she seeks to recover any damages that she may be entitled to as a result of BAC's premature foreclosure on her homestead. Tony Pitts, the Austin-based attorney for the plaintiff, declined to comment.

For more, see Woman sues over wrongful home foreclosure (Victoria homeowner claims loan servicing company committed fraud when they sold her house).

(1) It wouldn't surprise me that the reason the case was refiled in Federal court was as a result of the bank's request to remove the case to the Federal forum. Such a removal of a lawsuit from a state to a federal court is a commonly used maneuver in civil cases by big-time corporate defendants and their white-shoe law firms in lawsuits brought by individuals and other (possibly under-financed) plaintiffs. Such a removal typically increases the cost of litigation for the plaintiff, and in the event plaintiff's counsel is unfamiliar with litigating a case in a Federal court, this maneuver will effectively leave the case in limbo.

See generally, Judge Says Firm Must Explain ‘Fraudulent’ Removals or Pony Up $25K ("It is widely believed that plaintiffs, particularly individuals rather than corporations, fare better in state courts where they have greater likelihood of getting to a jury and often benefit from more favorable interpretations of law. Defendants in turn tend to prefer the federal courts." For more on fraudulent removals, see footnote 1 of an earlier post.

Now that this case has been refiled in Federal court, the bank can now seek dismissal of the lawsuit altogether (or at least portions thereof) by invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See footnote 3, below.

(2) For a sampling of other HAMP-related lawsuits brought against lenders & loan servicers for allegedly stringing borrowers along with empty loan modification promises, see:

• State of Arizona v. Countrywide Financial Corporation, et al.,
• State of Nevada v. Bank of America Corporation, et al.,
• Bosque v. Wells Fargo, Class Action Amended Complaint (Exhibits: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 - eight-page demand letter (offering Wells Fargo opportunity to settle HAMP claims)),
• Johnson v. Bank of America Home Loans Servicing, Class Action Amended Complaint,
• Durmic v. J.P. Morgan Chase, Class Action Complaint,
• Reyes v. OneWest, Class Action Amended Complaint,
• Belyea v. Litton Loan Servicing, Class Action Amended Complaint,
• Ponder et al. v. Bank of America, BAC Home Loans Servicing,
• Fraser v. Bank of America, N.A., et ano., Class Action Complaint,
• Silva v. Citimortgage, Inc., Class Action Complaint.

(3) To the extent some of the claims in this lawsuit are viewed by the court as an attempt by the homeowner to ask a Federal court to reverse the effect of a state court judgment, the chances of a request to set aside the foreclosure sale surviving the bank's motion to dismiss are little to none, based on the so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine. According to this doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims that effectively challenge state court judgments.

The application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in a similar foreclosure situation was recently addressed by a Federal appeals court in Wilson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust (In re Wilson), No. 10-2021-bk (2nd Cir. February 18, 2011) (bold text is my emphasis):

• Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over claims that effectively challenge state-court judgments. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).
  
  After the doctrine was modified by the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), we held that there are four requirements that must be met before the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may apply: (1) "the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court;" (2) "the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment;" (3) "the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment;" and (4) "the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced." Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
  
  Because dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court reviews de novo a court's application of the doctrine. Id. at 83.
  
  Here, application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was warranted in light of the connection between Wilson's federal complaint and the state court default foreclosure judgment in favor of DBNTC.
  
  First, the foreclosure judgment in favor of DBNTC indicates that Wilson "lost" in state court. See Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85.
  
  Second, Wilson instituted adversary proceedings against DBNTC in order to "complain of injuries caused" by the state court foreclosure judgment, see id., as the crux of her complaint was that DBNTC wrongfully foreclosed on the property in question.
  
  Third, in filing her complaint, Wilson "invite[d] [federal] court review and rejection" of the state court foreclosure judgment, see id., as she explicitly sought reversal of that judgment and re-vestment of title through her argument that DBNTC had lacked standing to foreclose.
  
  Fourth, the foreclosure judgment was rendered in June 2008, over five months before she filed her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and adversary complaint. See id.
  
  Accordingly, we conclude that the bankruptcy court correctly dismissed Wilson's complaint pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As a result of this conclusion, we are not required to consider Wilson's argument that the Connecticut state court order denying her motion to open and vacate the foreclosure judgment was void, because it was issued in violation of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
  
  We have considered Wilson's other arguments on appeal and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.

For another court ruling reaching the conclusion coming out of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (in a Florida case), see Parker v. Potter, Nos. 08-16332, 08-16667 (11th cir. 2010) (unpublished).

For another recent bankruptcy case (a New York case) applying Rooker-Feldman, see In re Agard, Case 8-10-77338-reg (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. February 10, 2011).

Go here for links to a couple of dozen more Rooker-Feldman foreclosure cases.