Monday, February 21, 2011

Long Island Bankruptcy Judge Gives MERS A Hammering In Ruling Explaining That It Lacks Standing To Foreclose

In Central Islip, New York, The Wall Street Journal reports:

  • A federal bankruptcy court judge issued an opinion on Thursday offering a scathing critique of the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, or MERS, the electronic-lien registry system built by the housing-finance industry to facilitate the bundling and selling of pools of mortgages.

  • The decision by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert E. Grossman in Central Islip, N.Y., didn’t change the outcome of the borrower’s foreclosure proceeding. The foreclosure had been approved earlier by a state court, and the judge ruled that he didn’t have the authority to stop it.(1)

  • But that didn’t stop [Judge] Grossman from offering an opinion that he said would have a “significant impact” on the industry by calling into question the rules and procedures that MERS uses to transfer mortgages and handle foreclosures on behalf of the largest U.S. banks.

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  • The opinion [] rejected any argument that MERS’s reach was so broad and deep that it should receive favorable treatment from the judiciary:

    The Court recognizes that an adverse ruling regarding MERS’s authority to assign mortgages or act on behalf of its member/lenders could have a significant impact on MERS and upon the lenders which do business with MERS throughout the United States. However, the Court must resolve the instant matter by applying the laws as they exist today. It is up to the legislative branch, if it chooses, to amend the current statutes to confer upon MERS the requisite authority to assign mortgages under its current business practices. MERS and its partners made the decision to create and operate under a business model that was designed in large part to avoid the requirements of the traditional mortgage recording process. This Court does not accept the argument that because MERS may be involved with 50% of all residential mortgages in the country, that is reason enough for this Court to turn a blind eye to the fact that this process does not comply with the law.

For more, see U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Questions Legal Claims of MERS.

See also Bloomberg: Merscorp Lacks Right to Transfer Mortgages, Judge Says.

For the court ruling, see In re Agard, Case 8-10-77338-reg (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. February 10, 2011).

Thanks to Mike Dillon at GetDShirtz.com for the heads-up on the story and a copy of the court ruling.

(1) Judge Grossman indicates that his hands were tied to undo the foreclosure in this particular case, and then proceeds to explain why he felt compelled to give an analysis as to why MERS lacks standing to foreclose anyway, in the following excerpt (bold text is my emphasis):

  • The Debtor’s objection is overruled by application of either the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, or res judicata. Under those doctrines, this Court must accept the state court judgment of foreclosure as evidence of U.S. Bank’s status as a creditor secured by the Property. Such status is sufficient to establish the Movant’s standing to seek relief from the automatic stay.

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  • Although the Court is constrained in this case to give full force and effect to the state court judgment of foreclosure, there are numerous other cases before this Court which present identical issues with respect to MERS and in which there have been no prior dispositive state court decisions. This Court has deferred rulings on dozens of other motions for relief from stay pending the resolution of the issue of whether an entity which acquires its interests in a mortgage by way of assignment from MERS, as nominee, is a valid secured creditor with standing to seek relief from the automatic stay. It is for this reason that the Court’s decision in this matter will address the issue of whether the Movant has established standing in this case notwithstanding the existence of the foreclosure judgment. The Court believes this analysis is necessary for the precedential effect it will have on other cases pending before this Court.

In concluding his ruling, he makes this observation:

  • This Court finds that MERS’s theory that it can act as a “common agent” for undisclosed principals is not support by the law. The relationship between MERS and its lenders and its distortion of its alleged “nominee” status was appropriately described by the Supreme Court of Kansas as follows: “The parties appear to have defined the word [nominee] in much the same way that the blind men of Indian legend described an elephant – their description depended on which part they were touching at any given time.” Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158, 166-67 (Kan. 2010).

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One of the constraints Judge Grossman cited for upholding the foreclosure judgment in this case, notwithstanding MERS' lack of standing to foreclose, was the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which is described in Wikipedia as follows:

  • The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a rule of civil procedure enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in two cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine holds that lower United States federal courts other than the Supreme Court should not sit in direct review of state court decisions unless Congress has specifically authorized such relief. In short, a federal court must not become a court of appeals for a state court decision.

'Leagle eagles' who don't find Wikipedia a satisfactory resource on this point and who have some time on their hands can check out Duke Law Journal: Allison B. Jones, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: What Does It Mean To Be Inextricably Intertwined?, 56 Duke L. J. 643 (2006).

See also Martin J. Bishop, Eleventh Circuit: Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars Post-Foreclosure TILA Recission Claim.

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