Federal Appeals Court Affirms 10-Year Prison Sentence For Notorious Central Florida Foreclosure Rescue, Home Equity Scammer

From a recent ruling from a federal appeals court:

• Peter James Porcelli, II, appeals his sentence for one count of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. He raises four issues on appeal.
  
  First, he argues that the district court erred in applying the U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 offense-level enhancement for abuse of trust or use of a special skill, particularly in light of its simultaneous application of the § 3B1.1 aggravated-role enhancement.
  
  Second, he claims that the financially distressed victims facing home foreclosure were not "vulnerable victims" for purposes of § 3A1.1(b)(1).
  
  Third, he contends that the portion of the forfeiture money judgment that exceeded the loss amount constituted a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
  
  Finally, he argues that the decision to impose the instant sentence to run consecutively to his sentence in a Southern District of Illinois telemarketing-fraud case was substantively unreasonable.
  
  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

For the ruling, see U.S. v. Porcelli, No. 10-14777 (11th Cir. September 21, 2011) (unpublished).

(1) Among the observations made by the appeals court in ruling against this lowlife are those appearing in the following five excerpts (anyone going after dirtbags lilke this guy, either in criminal prosecutions or civil lawsuits (either in state court or federal court), would be well advised to work into their presentations in court the following points in seeking stiff criminal penalties, and, in the case of civil lawsuits, stiff compensatory and punitive damages):

1. Porcelli and the others searched for homeowners who were in jeopardy of losing their homes through foreclosure, specifically targeting those who still had equity in their homes.



2. The probation officer calculated that 68 homeowner-victims borrowed a total of approximately $1.8 million. Of that amount, approximately $1.2 million constituted fraudulent loan fees and costs, and, thus, was the "loss and restitution" amount owed to the victims.



3. At the first sentencing hearing, several victims testified that Porcelli had caused them emotional and physical distress by manipulating, intimidating, and confusing them into the agreements, then harassing and threatening them and stealing their homes after they defaulted. One victim experienced high blood pressure and a heart attack as a result of Porcelli's actions, another was seeing a psychologist and taking considerable medication, and a third attempted to commit suicide.



4. "[T]he primary concern of § 3B1.3 is to penalize defendants who take advantage of a position that provides them freedom to commit or conceal a difficult-to-detect wrong." Garrison, 133 F.3d at 838 (quotation marks omitted). The court "must distinguish between those arms-length commercial relationships where trust is created by the defendant's personality or the victim's credulity, and relationships in which the victim's trust is based on [the] defendant's position in the transaction." Id. (quotation marks omitted).
   
   "Fraudulently inducing trust in an investor is not the same as abusing a bona fide relationship of trust with that investor." United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1567 (11th Cir. 1995).
   
   Here, Porcelli falsely held out Safe Harbour as a nonprofit foundation dedicated to "foreclosure relief." Victims contacted Porcelli in reliance on that representation, as well as on the misrepresentations that Safe Harbour was established to "keep [people] in [their] home[s]," "give [them] a second chance," "[s]ave [their] credit," and protect them from "predators" who wanted to profit from their misfortunes.
   
   Porcelli then took advantage of the victims' belief that he was a nonprofit foreclosure-relief counselor in order to induce them to take out second mortgages through Silverstone Lending or another of his for-profit lenders. Silverstone Lending's ability to make such mortgages and to create the attendant fees depended on Porcelli's state-issued mortgage-lending license.
   
   Under all the circumstances, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Porcelli held, or falsely led the victims to believe that he held, a bona fide relationship of trust with them. See § 3B1.3 & comment. (n.3); Garrison, 133 F.3d at 837.
   
   Furthermore, Porcelli's interactions with the victims were not limited to "arms-length" lending transactions in which Porcelli, as a representative of Silverstone Lending, "[f]raudulently induc[ed] trust in" the borrowers. See Garrison, 133 F.3d at 838; Mullens, 65 F.3d at 1567.
   
   Rather, Porcelli also used his falsely assumed position as a nonprofit foreclosure-relief coordinator to manipulate and intimidate the victims into believing that a second mortgage from Silverstone Lending was their only remaining option, and, in doing so, caused the victims to be more susceptible to signing the exorbitant mortgage contracts. Thus, the court did not err in finding that Porcelli abused his falsely assumed position of trust with the victims. See § 3B1.3 & comment. (n.3); Garrison, 133 F.3d at 837-38; Mullens, 65 F.3d at 1567.
   


5. "If the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim," he is subject to a two-level enhancement. § 3A1.1(b)(1).
   
   A "vulnerable victim" is a victim "who is unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct." Id., comment. (n.2). The adjustment applies when the defendant selects his victim due to his perception of the victim's vulnerability to the offense. United States v. Day, 405 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005).
   
   Thus, in determining whether the victims were "vulnerable," we focus on the facts known to the defendant when he decided to target the victims, not on the harm actually suffered by the victims. United States v. Page, 69 F.3d 482, 489 & n.6 (11th Cir. 1995). "It is clear that having bad credit or otherwise being in a precarious financial situation is a `vulnerability' to fraudulent financial solicitations . . . ." Id.
   
   When a fraudulent loan scheme is "specifically addressed . . . to persons with bad credit," it "target[s] the most desperate victims." Id. at 490. "We will not absolve. . . defendants of their culpability for having targeted `vulnerable victims' simply because, in casting out their net, they happened to ensnare and defraud some individuals who did not share this vulnerability." Id. at 491-92.
   
   Porcelli specifically targeted individuals who were financially distressed and were in danger of losing their homes through foreclosure. He marketed Safe Harbour as a nonprofit organization that would "give people a second chance when no one else w[ould]," and he wrote the marketing materials to appeal to people who were facing "financial pressures," bankruptcy, harassment by creditors, and "ruin[ed] . . . credit ratings."
   
   Although Porcelli suggests that some or all of the victims might have lost their homes despite their involvement with him, the actual harm suffered is irrelevant to this analysis. See Page, 69 F.3d at 489 n.6.
   
   Furthermore, his speculation that some of the victims might not have been financially distressed or might have sought the mortgages for reasons other than imminent foreclosure does not prove that the vulnerable-victim finding was plainly erroneous. See Massey, 443 F.3d at 818; Page, 69 F.3d at 491-92. The district court did not plainly err in finding that the victims were unusually susceptible to the mortgage-fraud scheme, that Porcelli had targeted them for that reason, and, thus, that the vulnerable-victim enhancement applied. See § 3A1.1(b)(1) & comment. (n.2); Massey, 443 F.3d at 818; Page, 69 F.3d at 489-90.